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SHIRKING AT THE SEC: THE





Deregulation, much like regulation itself, is a rational political re-
sponse to pressure from discrete economic groups that benefit from such
deregulation. Such pressures explain many, if not all, of the actions and
inactions of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) with respect
to implementing a national market system in the United States. For ex-
ample, Gregg Jarrell, the chief economist at the SEC, recently relied
upon such a "political support theory,"l to explain the SEC's abolition of
fixed-rate commissions on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
The abolition of fixed-rate commissions was an early, and possibly
the sole, aspect of the SEC's discharge of its responsibilities under a ma-
jor piece of deregulatory legislation. The 1975 legislation called upon the
Commission to implement a competitive market for securities trading by
developing a national market system. Despite such deregulatory legisla-
tion, Jarrell posits that the SEC, acting as a "political support maximiz-
ing regulator,"2 only acted to abolish fixed commission rates after the
market forces "had so eroded the economic rents flowing to the NYSE
cartel that the Exchange drastically reduced its "political demand" for
such commissions. At the same time, the political power of groups op-
t The authors presented an earlier version of this article at the Emory Law and Economics
Workshop. The authors would like to thank the workshop participants. particularly Professor William
J. Carney and Dean Thomas D. Morgan. for their useful comments. The authors also wish to thank
Sam Scott Miller for helpful comments on earlier drafts ofthis article. In addition. Marie Mariscalco.
Emory Law School class of 1985. pravided valuable research assistance.
• Assistant Professor of Law. Emory Law School A.B. 1977. Harvard University; J.D. 1982,
Yale University.
•• Research Fellow in Civil Liability. Yale Law School, and Research Professor ofEconomics.
Emory Law and Economics Center. B.A. 1966. Oklahoma State University; Ph.D. 1980, University of
Chicago (economics).
. 1. Jarrell. Change at the Exchange: The Causes and Effects ofDeregulation. 27 J.L. & EcON.
273 (1984). Jarrell argues that abolition of fixed rate commissions by the SEC was a "rational polit-
ical response to increasing elasticity of demand of institutions for NYSE brokerage services." Id. at
274. Jarrell derives the political support theory from two sources: Stigler, The Theory ofEconomic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. EcON. 3 (1971), and Pe1tzman, Toword a More General Theory ofRegulation,
19 J.L. & EcON. 211 (1976). For a wider-sweeping look at the dynamics of special interest groups in
legislative evolution, see M. OLSON, THE RIsE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS (1982).
2. Jarrell, supra note I, at 281, 300.
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posing the fixed rates was growing through the continuing consolidation
of diverse small stockholdings into a more compact, politically agile
group of larger "institutional" holdings by mutual funds, insurance com-
panies, and the like.
This article investigates the SEC's failure to take any significant ad-
ditional steps to deregulate the securities markets, despite Congress's ex-
press mandate in 1975 that such deregulation take place. All the other
important competitive restrictions, such as rules against exchange delist-
ing and restrictions on off-board trading, still exist. This article examines
the major American exchanges, the national market system legislation,
and the SEC's failure to administer this law as written, and concludes
that one can expect the remaining restraints on trade to prove more long-
lived than the fixed-rate commissions.
As was long the case with fixed-rate commissions, the SEC has justi-
fied its refusal to implement the remaining national market system legis-
lation by arguing that the public might be harmed by such deregulation.
This article considers and rejects the SEC's arguments against deregula-
tion, and suggests that a political support maximization theory provides
a more complete explanation for the failure of the national market sys-
tem legislation. In brief, the SEC is not motivated by some "public inter-
est," but rather by the changing strength of competing, well-organized
special interests. This article concludes that a proper understanding of
what motivates the SEC bodes ill for the national market system.
II. THE ORIGIN~AND ACTIVITIES OF THE STOCK EXCHANGES OF
THE UNITED STATES
On May 17, 1792, twenty-four stockbrokers signed a contract called
the "Buttonwood Agreement," creating a trading group that became the
New York Stock Exchange. The contract survived completely intact un-
til 1975, and remains largely intact today.3 The agreement read:
We, the subscribers, brokers for the purchase and sale of public
stocks, do hereby solemnly promise and pledge ourselves to each
other that we will not buy or sell from this date, for any person
whatsoever, any kind of public stocks at a rate less than one-quarter
of one percent commission on one specie value, and that we will give
preference to each other in our negotiations.4
The Buttonwood Agreement sounds much like a naked cartel agree-
ment, designed to reap profits for the signatories in excess of those neces-
sary to keep them in the brokerage business. 5 However, such an
3. L. SLOANE, THE ANATOMY OF THE FLOOR II (1980); F. EAMES, THE NEW YORK STOCK
EXCHANGE 14 (1968).
4. F. EAMES, supra note 3, at 14.
5. C. WELLES, THE LAST DAYS OF THE CLUB 3-40 (1975); Baxter, NYSE Fixed Commission
Rates: A Private Cartel Goes Public, 22 STAN. L. REv. 675, 676-79 (1970). The exchanges are
considered to be immunized from antitrust liability for what would otherwise be per se violations of
§ I of the Sherman Act because Congress has impliedly repealed the antitrust laws by imposing the
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agreement may well have been quite beneficial to both consumers and
exchange members at a time when stockholding was exceptional and
communications systems were primitive. Under the circumstances ex-
isting in 1792, a physically centralized exchange was the only plausible
way to bring the buyers and sellers of common stock together on a de-
pendable, continuing basis. An agreement among only twenty-four men
could continue to be effective on a nearly national basis for a century and
a half before regulatory intervention only if the agreement fulfilled a so-
cially beneficial function. In fact, after signing the Buttonwood Agree-
ment, the NYSE confronted and dominated a flow of competing new
exchanges. The few competitors that have survived are small relative to
the NYSE.6 Any argument that the Buttonwood Agreement fulfilled no
socially beneficial function would thus require a parallel argument ac-
counting for the failure of competing exchanges to use arrangements that
the public found more palatable. This latter argument is not in evidence.
Immediately, one is struck by the similarity of the Buttonwood
Agreement to modern resale price agreements,7 and arguably the ex-
change members' motivation was also similar: regular, dependable bro-
kers who stood ready to trade on both good (busy) days and bad (slack)
days decided to give preference, if all else were equal, to other regular
dependable brokers. The regular brokers thereby protected themselves
from "free riding" brokers who rushed in on the good days, then out on
the bad days. Only by rewarding the brokers who chose to stand by their
posts on a regular basis could the market be assured that traders would
be available to trade whenever stock sellers wished to alter their portfo-
lios, not just when recent events or new information created a temporary
upsurge in trading activity.
The New York Stock Exchange was predicated on the belief that
public knowledge that trades could be made whenever desirable, rather
than only under exceptional circumstances, would increase the willing-
ness of investors to hold stocks rather than other assets such as bonds, or
real property. Consequently, the size of the brokerage business would
increase, and almost everyone involved would benefit. Brokers would do
regulatory scheme of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Gordon v. New York Stock Exch., 422
U.S. 659 (1975):
The Securities Exchange Act was intended by Congress to leave the supervision of the
fixing of reasonable rates of commission to the SEC. Interposition of the antitrust laws, which
would bar fixed commission rates as per se violations of Shennan Act. . . would preclude and
prevent the operation of the Exchange Act as intended by Congress and as effectuated through
SEC regulatory activity. Implied repeal of the antitrust laws is, in fact, necessary to make the
Exchange Act work as it was intended; failure to imply repeal would render nugatory the legis-
lative provision for regulatory agency supervision of exchange commission rates.
[d. at 691.
6. See infra notes 54-56 and accompanying text for a list of the American exchanges and
trading volumes.
7. For a discussion of the modem "free rider problem," common to resale price maintenance
agreements and stock exchanges, see R. POSNER, EcONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 351,468-69 (2d ed.
1977).
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more business in the long-run, albeit at the expense of having to hang
around the exchange on slack days. Asset holders would have available
superior instruments among which to choose. Securities issuers would
find that their issues had become relatively more attractive to buyers
when contrasted with alternative assets.
Over the years, the NYSE has taken on other socially valuable func-
tions. Those brokers who handle specific securities daily find it worth-
while to know substantially more about the companies issuing those
securities than do investors who, having other pursuits to occupy their
hours, manipulate their portfolios only occasionally. This is a straight-
forward application of the economics of information.8 Consequently, in-
vestors commonly turn to their broker for information about those
securities with which the broker is familiar. The NYSE effectively
pooled the information of all its members by refusing to trade certain
securities when relatively well informed Exchange members decided the
securities under scrutiny had attributes unattractive to the usual Ex-
change customers. Thus, listing on the NYSE came to represent a sort of
"NYSE-sea1-of-approval," which conveyed valuable information to in-
vestors even when the particular broker with whom an investor dealt
knew little or nothing about the company issuing the security. To facili-
tate judgment in this regard, the NYSE ultimately began to specify cer-
tain minimum behaviorial and reporting requirements that each issuer
must meet before the Exchange would even consider listing the issuer's
securities.9 To list a security on the NYSE today, an issuer must place
before the Exchange:
the information essential to its determination as to the suitability of
the securities for public trading on the Exchange and, equally im-
portant, of providing for the investing public such information as it
may reasonably be presumed to require as an aid to its judgment as
to the merits of the security.IO
8. See George J. Stigler's Nobel Prize winning The &onomics of Information, 69 J. POL.
BeON. 213 (1961).
9. See Comment, Stock Exchange Listing Agreements As a Vehicle for Corporate Governance,
129 U. PA. L. REv. 1427, 1430-35 (1981).
10. N.Y. STOCK EXCHANGE INC., N.Y.S.E. CoNSTITUTION AND RULES (CCH) 11 2495F
(1983). The New York Stock Exchange listing agreement 'is the traditional means by which the
NYSE enforces its listing standards. The members first adopted the agreement in 1899. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, II SEC Docket 1945 (1977). See also Comment, supra note 9, at
1427. Data about issuers from applications for an exchange listing is presented in narrative form.
Financial statements accompany the information. The specific data required for listing varies from
company to company, and from industry to industry. The New York Stock Exchange Company
Manual, §§ B2 & B3 (1981) contains detailed directions for preparation [hereinafter cited as
N.Y.S.E. Manual].
Since 1926, the NYSE has refused to list companies that create a class of nonvoting common
stock. In addition, the NYSE will delist a class of stock of a company that fails to solicit proxies for
meetings of its shareholders. N.Y.S.E. Manual, supra, at xxi, A-280, A-134. Similarly, the NYSE
will not list a company whose board of directors is divided into more than three classes for purposes
of election. Id. at A-280. Nor will the Exchange list a company whose stock is subject to "unusual
restrictions." Id. at A-280.
There is. some evidence, however, that the NYSE will not enforce its own listing rules when
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By reducing the cost of information to the NYSE, such requirements
have increased the precision of the Exchange's judgment, as manifested
in the listing seal-of-approval. II
Many commentators now argue, however, that the Buttonwood
Agreement has served its purpose, and that such an agreement is a naked
restraint on trade,12 fundamentally inefficient, and incompatible with
Congress's stated goal of creating a national market system for securi-
ties. 13 According to the argument, certain aspects of the Buttonwood
Agreement survive to this day not because they fulfill socially beneficial
functions in this age of modem communications, but rather because the
SEC came into existence, allegedly for other reasons, between the time of
Buttonwood and the present "electronics revolution." In addition, the
commentators assert that the SEC has effectively policed the cartel agree-
ment among the major exchanges and discouraged potentially competing
institutions, thereby enabling the major exchanges to survive at their
present sizes far beyond their useful lives. 14
The notion that the SEC behaves as if one of its principal duties is to
police a cartel of exchanges and brokers is consistent with the modem
economic theory of regulation. IS Indeed, the economic theory of regula-
enforcement is not in the interest of the Exchange. The NYSE is fearful of losing customers to the
American Stock Exchange and the over-the-counter market, and is therefore prepared to amend its
rules to avoid delisting companies that wish to amend their charters to violate the exchange rules.
See Blumstein, Big Board Panel Urges Eased Listing Standard, N.Y. Times, Jan. 4, 1985, at 04
(Business), col. 4. The NYSE has a rule that prohibits firms from issuing more than one class of
common stock with different voting rights. Several corporations, including Dow Jones & Company,
the Coastal Corporation, General Cinema Corporation, and Hershey Foods have all said that they
would leave the NYSE if its rules were not amended to enable them to issue a second class of
common stock. Id.
In one instance, the NYSE announced it was willing to consider amending its rules rather than
delisting Dow Jones Corporation stock. Dow Jones proposed to create a new class of common stock
with different voting rights than its other class of stock. Proxy Statement of Dow Jones Corporation
12-14 (Mar. 16, 1984). Unlike the NYSE, the National Association of Securities Dealers has no rule
prohibiting firms from issuing more than one class of common stock. See Blumstein, supra, at 04.
The NYSE responded with a proposed rule that would allow companies to issue a class of stock with
up to 10 times the voting power of current shares if two-thirds of the shareholders and a majority of
the board agreed to the new issue. The proposal came from a subcommittee of NYSE members
appointed to examine the NYSE rules after several companies proposed to issue special classes of
common stock.
11. Over time the Exchange's demands evolved as investors' preferences changed. After June
30, 1978, for example, the NYSE required that all issuers maintain an audit committee "comprised
solely of directors independent of management and free from any relationship that, in the opinion of
the board of directors, would interfere with the exercise of independent judgment by a committee
member." Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,346, 11 SEC Docket 1945 (1977).
12. See C. WELLES, supra note 5, at 9-10; Baxter, supra note 5, at 675; Gamey, Rivals and
Interlopers in the History of the New York Security Market, 52 J. POL. EcON. 128 (1944).
13. See supra text accompanying note 2.
14. Academics have contended that "the NYSE was a cartel, and the SEC its enforcement
arm." Jarrell, supra note 1, at 1. See H. STOLL, REGULATION OF SECURmES MARKETS: AN
EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF INCREASED CoMPETITION (1979); Tinic & West, The Securities
Industry Under Negotiated Brokerage Commissions: Change in the Structure and Performance of
New York Stock Exchange Member Firms, 11 BELL J. EcON. 29 (1980); Schwert, Public Regulation
ofthe National Securities Exchanges: A Test ofthe Copture Hypothesis, 8 BELL J. EcON. 129 (1977).
15. Jarrell, supra note 1. Jarrell argues that the SEC's regulation of the exchanges has permit-
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tion predicts that the owners of investments particular to an industry-in
the present case, the investments consist of the infrastructure and human
expertise of the exchanges and their members-will seek regulation
whenever innovations make potential new forms of competition threaten-
ing. 16 The legislative body usually gives a regulatory agency powers that
enable the agency, allegedly in the "public interest," to require universal
behavior that before regulation only the "most reputable" members of
the regulated industries practiced. This policy has the political advan-
tage of appearing to retard "unethical" practices. But, in a way not
nearly so apparent, the policy hampers the innovation of techniques that
new entrants otherwise may have introduced. Indeed, these new tech-
niques may have been the principal attraction of the entrants from the
consumer's viewpoint.
The company disclosure requirements of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934 (1934 Act)17 closely track those of the New York Stock
Exchange. As Professor Benston has pointed out, most of the companies
on the NYSE already disclosed the most significant financial information
that the 1934 Act later required to be disclosed}S The securities laws of
the 1930's thus institutionalized the long standing practices of the NYSE
and its members: a "prospectus prepared by a leading Wall Street house
in 1928 could, with really insignificant differences in financial disclosures,
ted the Commission to monitor and enforce price-fixing by brokers. Jarrell concludes that the SEC's
implementation of exchange rules is consistent with predictions generated by a "capture theory" of
regulation. See id. at 274, 281-82, 300. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and
the Protection ofInvestors, 70 VA. L. REv. 669, 670-72 (1984). Cf P. MACAvOY, THE EcONOMIC
EFFECTS OF REGULATION (1965); Stigler, supra note 1; Pe1tzman, supra note 1 (or almost any recent
economic textbook on industrial organization or regulation).
Note that the theory of regulation does not necessarily imply that employees of the SEC know
or believe that they are policing a cartel. It is enough that one side of the market that the SEC
regulates, i.e. the exchanges and brokers, have an advantage in presenting timely arguments and
information before the Commission. The advantages arise because each exchange and broker is
sensitive to the activities of the SEC on a daily basis, whereas few investors can afford to track the
arcane workings of an institution that is of marginal concern for their private affairs.
The odd investor who does become especially vexed by some ruling of the Commission is apt to
find that the investor's reform efforts will be dwarfed by a mass of evidence and testimony emanating
from the exchanges, or, barring that, vitiated by substitute rulemakings or subsequent reconsidera-
tion of the original proposal. Even if the reformer is successful for a time, most of the benefits of
those efforts will accrue to other investors, not to the reformer, whereas all the costs were borne by
the reformer. The exchanges, in contrast, bear the costs of opposition, but also stand to reap most of
the benefits of their efforts.
16. See R. NOLL, M. PECK & J. MCGoWAN, EcONOMIC AsPECI'S OF TELEVISION REGULA-
TION 124-26, 148, 151-52 (1983); E. KITCH, REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE CoM-
MERCE 37-42 (1981); L. HARTZ, ECONOMIC POLICY AND DEMOCRATIC THOUGHT:
PENNSYLVANIA, 1776-1860 (1948); G. MILLER, RAILROADS AND THE GRANGER LAWS (1971);
Benham, The Effect ofAdvertising on the Price ofEyeglasses, 15 J.L. & EcON. 337 (1972). See also
Olson, supra note 1, at 63 ("Special interest groups also slow growth by reducing the rate at which
resources are reallocated from one activity or industry to another in response to new technologies or
conditions."); Stigler, supra note I, at 36 (Stigler's central thesis is that regulation is "actively sought
by an industry").
17. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1982) (as amended).
18. Benston, Required Disclosure and the Stock Market: An Evaluation of the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 63 AM. EcON. REv. 132, 135 (1973).
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obtain a clearance from the Corporate Finance Division of the SEC to-
day."19 Hence, the SEC began requiring firms to compile and dissemi-
.nate NYSE-style information just when the improving communications
and information technologies were beginning to make it possible to cre-
ate faster and cheaper ways of getting similar information to investors.
, . Two sides of a debate have now been laid bare. One set of argu-
.ments focuses on the original strengths of the NYSE vis-a-vis its compet-
.notsand argues that the exchange practices are efficient, and survive and
pr~pe~with no particular aid from the SEC. The opposing set of argu-
. ~e.~ts focuses ()n the now burgeoning "electronic revolution" that was
..,' .·o'Iij,Y:be.glrining when the SEC was formed, and argues that for the benefit
.' ·b'r.exlsting C:xchanges the SEC artificially institutionalized a form of or-
"g~tion that is now obsolete-a format, however, with which the ex-
i.~ting exchanges were already well practiced.
. ~ .... The next section considers various restrictions on where securities
tr~ing.may take place, catalogues the restrictions presently in place, and
speculates about the contours of the market that will exist if the SEC
removes such restrictions. Abandonment of the current regulatory
scheme .probably will be accompanied by a "shake out" of the securities
market. Many stocks currently traded on organized exchanges may
move. to the over-the-counter market, and certain other stocks, now
traded over-the-counter, may gravitate to the organized exchanges. The
securities markets may also evolve as this article envisions even if the
SEC fails to aid that move, but the change will occur much more gradu-
ally in that event. The change will occur as the natural evolution of the
economy displaces some of today's major stocks and replaces them with
newer issues that, even now, are subject to less far-reaching regulations.
III. THE NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM CONCEPT
In 1975, Congress amended the Securities and Exchange Act of
1934 by adding section l1A, ostensibly to foster the creation of a national
market system.20 While observers considered the 1975 amendment a ma-
jor change in the securities laws,21 Congress made the statute remarkably
vague. "To allow maximum flexibility,"22 Congress did not even define
the term national market system, but directed the SEC to "facilitate the
establishment" of this ephemeral concept.23
19. H. MANNE & E. SALOMAN, WALL STREET IN TRANSITION: THE EMERGING SYSTEM
AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EcONOMY 35 (1974).
20. Securities Acts Amendments of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-29, § 7, 89 Stat. 11 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1976».
21. R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, SECURmES REGULATION-CASES AND MATERIALS 446 (5th
ed. 1982) (NMS legislation involved "extensive rewriting" of the Exchange Act).
22. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 14.416. Development ofa National Market System, 14 SEC
Docket 31 (1978).
23. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § IIA(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2) (1982) [hereinafter
cited as 1934 Act]. ''The commission is directed, therefore, having due regard for the public interest,
the protection of investors, and the maintenance of fair and orderly markets, to use its authority
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The 1975 amendment declared the securities markets to be an "im-
portant national asset which must be preserved and strengthened."24
The national market system legislation also articulated certain objectives
and directed the Commission to carry them out. These objectives were
to assure economically efficient securities transactions; fair competition
between brokers and dealers, and between exchanges and markets; the
availability of information; the execution of investors' orders in the best
market; and an opportunity to execute orders without the participation
of dealers.2s
Ten years later, Congress's vision of a complete revamping of the
securities markets has hardly begun to be realized.26 Calls are being
made to abandon the costly project,27 and the SEC has done little to
implement the congressional plan. Simply put, the world looks little dif-
ferent now than it did when Congress originally passed the legislation.
The SEC cannot blame this failure on congressional refusal to give the
SEC sufficient rulemaking authority to implement the system.28 In fact,
under this chapter to facilitate the establishment of a national market system for securities . . . ."
Id.
24. Id. § IIA(a)(I)(A), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(I)(A).
25. Id. § IIA(a)(I)(C), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(I)(C). The legislation specifically said it was in
the public interest to assure:
(i) economically efficient execution of securities transactions;
(ii) fair competition among brokers and dealers, among exchange markets, and between ex-
change markets and markets other than exchange markets;
(iii) the availability to brokers, dealers, and investors of information with respect to quotations
for and transactions in securities;
(iv) the practicability of brokers executing investors' orders in the best market; and
(v) an opportunity, consistent with the provisions of clauses (i) and (iv) of this subparagraph,
for investors' orders to be executed without the participation of a dealer.
Id.
26. See SUBCOMM. ON OVERSIGHT & INVESTIGATIONS OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTER-
STATE & FOREIGN COMMERCE, 96TH CONG., 2D SESS., NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM: FIVE YEAR
STATUS REPORT 8 (Comm. Print 1980) [hereinafter cited as OVERSIGHT STUDY). The report stated,
"The Securities and Exchange Commission describes the creation ofa National Market as an 'evolu-
tionary process.' That evolutionary process is still in the Paleolithic age." Id at 2. See also Poser,
Restructuring the Stock Markets: A Critical Look at the SEC's National Market System, 56 N.Y.U.
L. REv. 883, 885 (1981).
27. Poser, supra note 26, at 958 ("Congress and the SEC should reconsider the desirability of
[the] project that has already cost millions of dollars of government and private resources ... .").
28. 1934 Act § IIA(a)(2) & (3)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-I(2) & (3)(B) (1982). The Commission is
directed to use its authority "to facilitate the establishment of a national market system for securities
...." Id. at § IIA(a)(2), 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(2). The Commission may by rule or order "author-
ize or require self-regulatory organizations to act jointly with respect to matters as to which they
share authority ... in ... developing ... a national market system ...." Id at § IIA(3)(B), 15
U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(3)(B).
Even prior to the enactment of the national market system proposa1s, the SEC had the authority
to alter market or industry relationships in the securities markets. Werner, Adventure in Social
Control of Finance: The National Market System for Securities, 75 COLUM. L. REv. 1233, 1254-55
(1975); but see Poser, supra note 26, at 887 n.lO. Whether the SEC would retain its apparent far-
reaching authority if it actually tried to use that authority remains an open question. During an
interview, Arthur Burns, then Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, remarked that so-called
independent agencies risk losing their independence unless they act (non-independently) in ways
consistent with the interests of Congress and the President. Interview on the CBS Evening News
(June 13, 1972). If congressional interest predicated establishing, as opposed to merely endorsing,
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the SEC enjoys sweeping authority to guide the development of the na-
tional market system.29 This authority includes "a mandate to eliminate
existing anticompetitive rules of the stock exchanges and the ability to
require the development of national market system facilities."30 Rather,
the failure may arise from recognition by the SEC and the exchanges that
the proposal implicitly is one to replace personnel, both in the SEC and
in the securities markets, with electronics. Alternatively, the national
market system concept possibly is failing because the organized securities
exchanges are simply the most efficient means of organizing stock trading
activity. If so, the national market system was doomed from the start
because the market has already reached its most efficient configuration.
However, statistics on those few stocks that can be traded without re-
strictions imply that this later alternative is not the case.3l
Achieving a genuine national market system seems to require a two-
step process. The first step is to remove certain exchange rules and SEC
enforcement procedures. For example, the continued existence of off-
board trading restrictions,32 which prohibit exchange members from
trading "listed" stocks outside the confines of an organized exchange, are
a primary obstacle to a national market system. A related set of impedi-
ments to a national market system are SEC and exchange prohibitions on
delisting. When a stock is listed on an exchange, sometimes without the
approval of the parent corporation, exchange members may trade the
stock only on an exchange.33 Once a stock is listed, however, delisting is
virtually impossible.34 Finally, the exchange specialists' trading advan-
tages, which the SEC has protected, must be stripped away to create a
level playing field among competing market participants.35 Once the
SEC has implemented such policies and a truly national market system is
in place, the second step in the process will consist of monitoring a sim-
ple set of rules to ensure that traders are reporting transactions as they
occur, and that communications systems are effectively linking the mar-
ket participants.
The SEC has set about its work of facilitating the establishment of a
the NMS, the task could be forced on a reluctant SEC through legislation that has not yet been
forthcoming.
29. Indeed, the SEC's involvement in the project is, in all likelihood, the cause of the legisla-
tion's failure. Market forces would achieve the correct configuration of trading activity without
regulatory supervision, but the apparent public "need" for an SEC bureaucracy would then be sub-
stantially curtailed. See infra text accompanying notes 114-23.
30. Letter of Transmittal from Representative Bob Eckhardt (Chairman, Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigation) to Representative Harley O. Staggers (Chairman, Committee on Inter-
state and Foreign Commerce) (Aug. 26, 1980), reprinted in OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 26, at
III. This report indicates the Commission's failure to take steps toward developing competition in a
national market system. Representative Eckhardt also questions the adequacy of the current com-
munications system between markets.
31. See infra text accompanying notes 211-17.
32. See infra text accompanying notes 88-113.
33. See infra text accompanying notes 57-58.
34. See infra text accompanying notes 163-82.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 229-35.
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national market system in precisely the wrong order. First, it has at-
tempted halfheartedly to establish communications systems between
markets. Such systems are of little value, however, as long as regulations
force transactions through the old channels anyway, and therefore the
systems are seldom used. 36 The SEC then justifies continued restraints
on trade by claiming that the absence of such communications systems
dictate maintaining the status quo rather than deregulating, a process
that, of course, would reduce the SEC's own importance and authority.3?
If the SEC is going to establish a national market system, the proper
process seems to be to eliminate the restrictions on market participation,
then to allow the market to dictate the evolution of the appropriate com-
munications systems. This has been the pattern in the foreign exchange,
the United States government securities, and the municipal securities
markets. Not surprisingly, the SEC's actions have permitted vested in-
terests-such as certain members of the various stock exchanges, and
members of the SEC's own bureaucracy-to impede the development of
a national market system.38
IV. EXPECTED BENEFITS OF A NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM
Several members of Congress claimed to expect "substantial bene-
fits" for the marketplace from successful implementation of a national
market system.39 Specifically, they argued that investors would be more
likely to get the best available prices when buying or selling stock, and
the whole market would become a single efficient price-setting mecha-
nism.4O Although the House Subcommittee on Commerce and Finance
recognized the strength of the nation's securities markets, the subcom-
36. See Poser, supra note 26, at 918-27 (reviewing attempts to develop market linkage
systems).
37. The SEC's position is that the lack of adequate communications systems will lead to a
problem known as fragmentation. See infra text accompanying notes 125-34 (discussing
fragmentation).
38. There is certainly nothing new about alliances between the SEC and the exchanges on
policy issues that affect the exchanges' profitability. See S. PHILLIPS & J. ZECHER, THE SEC AND
THE PUBLIC INTEREST 53-87 (1981) (observing that the SEC's role in the abolition of fixed commis-
sions on the NYSE had no impact but imposed heavy costs on the deregulatory plan); see also
Jarrell, supra note 1.
39. As the OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 26, at 8, noted:
The anticipated benefits of a National Market System, developed in accordance with the
requirements of the 1975 Amendments, were substantial. Investors would have the ability to
get their orders executed at the best price available anywhere in the United States when they
bought or sold stock. The pricing mechanism would be more efficient and investors could more
easily sell or buy stock. Fees, or commissions, charged by their brokers would be based on a
cost structure related to a more efficient marketplace. And, better services would be provided
by the marketplaces.
Securities firms would also benefit in a number of ways. To the extent the manual, paper
intensive order execution process would be automated and the number of unknown or ques-
tioned trades reduced, the costs associated with executing orders would decrease. Further, a
firm's income would be enhanced by the ability to produce revenue in the business of dealing in
listed securities. Such reduced costs and enhanced income would help improve securities firm's
return on equity.
40. [d.
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mittee "was convinced that without change, the world's finest market
would decline to a lesser status, with a significant adverse economic im-
pact on the country."41 The subcommittee wanted to prevent the securi-
ties markets from fading from world prominence.42 Thus, Congress did
not intend to eliminate the distinctions between the over-the-counter and
the exchange markets, or to force all trading into one forum. Instead, the
congressional action plainly mandated that competitive forces dictate the
future configuration of the trading markets.43
A. Modern Securities Markets
Two distinct but related markets are combined within our modem
trading system, the new issue market and the secondary market. The
new issue market gives companies investment capital while simultane-
ously giving the public investment opportunities. In contrast, the secon-
dary, or trading, market provides a forum through which traders may
later buy and sell the investment vehicles created in the new issue mar-
ket. The economic functioning of the secondary markets is closely re-
lated to the success of the new issue market, for if investors expect the
secondary markets to work poorly, issuers will have to heavily discount
the new securities.44 It is the efficiency of these secondary markets that
Congress intended the national market system to enhance directly.
The existence of an organized secondary market for a security en-
hances the security's value by increasing its liquidity. Liquidity is a mar-
ket characteristic that assures investors that they can promptly dispose of
or purchase securities at a price reasonably related to the immediately
preceding price for that security45 and to the anticipated succeeding
prices.46 Moreover, competition among participants in a liquid market
assures even the more ignorant investors that these market prices reflect
all the publicly available information about the firms behind the securi-
ties. If the price momentarily is too low, the knowledgeable market par-
41. Id. at 5.
42. Id.; see also SUBCOMM. ON COMMERCE AND FINANCE OF THE HOUSE COMM. ON INTER-
STATE AND FOREIGN COMMERCE, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY I (Sub-
comm. Print 1972); H.R. REP. No. 123, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 51 (1975).
43. Gillis & Dreker, Securities Law and Regulation, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept./Oct. 1982, at 13.
These authors gleen this interpretation from legislative history: "from the point of view of preserv-
ing the competing markets for securities that have developed, breaking down all barriers to competi-
tion that do not serve a valid regulatory purpose, and encouraging maximum reliance on
communication and data processing equipment consistent with justifiable costs." Id. (quoting S.
REP. No. 75, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977».
44. See Poser, supra note 26, at 886. ("For the sale of a new issue of securities to succeed,
prospective purchasers must have a reasonable assurance of liquidity" in the secondary market.)
45. Id.
46. 2 Constitution and Rules, N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 11 2704, Rule 704.10. See J. STONE,
ONE WAY FOR WALL STREET 43 (1975):
Liquidity can best be defined as that characteristic which permits any amount of a good to be
sold in any given length of time at a price equal to the true value. The more the price is found
to vary from intrinsic value as the speed or size of transactions increases, the less liquid a
market may be said to be.
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tlclpants compete for the bargain and quickly drive the price up to
appropriate levels. If the price is too high, the well informed participants
sell until the price falls to appropriate levels. In either event, the aggre-
gated value of a firm's securities closely reflects the firm's true economic
value as currently known to the market. This competition among knowl-
edgeable investors makes it possible for all investors to know at all times
the approximate value of their holdings. Only with such knowledge can
individual investors estimate their wealth constraints, and only by esti-
mating their wealth constraints can they optimally allocate consumption
and investment throughout their lives.47
Liquidity is valuable48 to purchasers only to the extent they are con-
fident that the market still will be liquid when they become sellers. For a
new issue to succeed, purchasers must have a reasonable assurance of
liquidity in the secondary market. Moreover, increased liquidity changes
the relationship between a shareholder and a corporation by allowing
shareholders to react to corporate decisions, thus increasing management
accountability.49 The greater the liquidity of a corporation's shares, the
greater the opportunity for the marketplace to express an opinion about
corporate management through the buying and selling of shares, thus
enabling the market to influence corporation decisions to replace inept or
dishonest managers. In general, a smoothly functioning market enables
economic resources of all sorts to be drawn into firms where the re-
sources are of higher than average value, and expelled from firms where
the resources are of lower than average value. Knowledgeable investors
and investment companies consequently will consider a security for
which there is a continuous two-sided buy and sell market a better invest-
ment than an otherwise identical security for which there is no such
market. so
A related congressional concern also embraced in the national mar-
ket system legislation is that of reducing transaction costs.SI While the
mere existence of such costs "has no direct relevance to economic effi-
ciencies,,,s2 artificial enhancement of such costs does. Absent govern-
ment interference, market pressures will organize the markets "in ways
that economize on the cost of transacting."s3 In terms of buying and
selling stock, the transaction costs consist of the costs of information
47. In addition, the characteristics of increased liquidity create value in other ways. Increased
liquidity permits companies to ascertain readily the cost of incurring new debt. Increased liquidity
also lowers borrowing costs by allowing securities to be used as collateral for loans. S. ROBBINS,
THE SECURITIES MARKETS: OPERATIONS AND ISSUES 33 (1966); Poser, supra note 26, at 886.
48. See Knauss, Corporate Governance-A Moving Target, 79 MICH. L. REv. 478, 481 (1981)
(liquidity is of "overriding" importance to the investor).
49. See id. at 481 (the existence of a marketplace for shares changes the relationship of the
shareholder to the corporation by giving the shareholder flexibility comparable to a partner's right to
dissolution).
50. See Poser, supra note 26, at 886.
51. Id. at 905-06.
52. Demsetz, The Cost of Transacting, 1968 Q.J. BeON. 33.
53. Id. See also A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, UNIVERSITY EcONOMICS 49-50 (1967).
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about the market and the underlying asset, brokerage fees, the spread
between bid prices and offer prices, and transfer taxes. 54
In contrast to 1792 when the Buttonwood Agreement was signed,
current technology permits a choice among several trading forums. If
brokerage fees and the spread between bid and offered prices can be re-
duced in one particular forum without any concomitant increase in infor-
mation costs, then transactions should gravitate to that forum. If one of
the national market system legislation's goals is to ensure that such gravi-
tation takes place, the SEC would seem to have a legal obligation to re-
quire the removal of all artificial barriers to the creation of a system that
allows such gravitation to occur.
B. Liquidity on the Stock Exchanges
A stock exchange55 is simply an organized forum where the buying
and selling of securities takes place. Historically, the New York Stock
Exchange accounted for eighty to ninety percent of the total dollar vol-
ume on all organized exchanges.56 The NYSE has maintained its pri-
macy; more than eighty percent of stock trading on United States
exchanges still takes place on the NYSE.57 One cannot easily trade
stocks listed on an organized exchange over-the-counter because of the
"off-board trading restrictions"58 that prevent exchange members from
trading exchange listed stocks outside of an organized exchange on
which the security is listed. All of the United State's securities exchanges
54. Demsetz, supra note 52, at 33.
55. There are ten stock exchanges presently operating in the United States: the American,
Boston, Chicago Board of Options, Cincinnati, Intermountain, Midwest, New York, Pacific, Phila-
delphia, and Spokane.
56. From 1935 through 1962, the dollar volume of transactions on the New York Stock Ex-
change, as a percentage of transactions on all exchanges, "ranged from a high of 89.24% in 1938 to a
low of 82.44% in 1961." R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 21, at 481 n.l; see alsa REPORT OF
THE SPECIAL STUDY OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS OF THE SEC, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong.,
1st Sess. (pt. 2) 1076-77 (1963) (Table VIII-64) [hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY]. By 1966, the
NYSE volume had declined to 80.1 % of all exchange transactions. Securities Exchange Act Release
No. 8239, at 4 n.2 (Jan. 26, 1968), reprinted in 33 Fed. Reg. 2393 (1968). But by 1979, the NYSE
had rebounded to 83.65% of all exchange transactions. SEC ANNUAL REPORT 130 (1980).
57. Jarrell, supra note 1, at 274; R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 21, at 481:
The operation of the New York Stock Exchange was historically based upon four interrelated
principles or rules, all of them designed to protect the economic position of the members of that
exchange ... 1) [1]imited membership and exclusive dealing;. . . 2) [t]he prohibition against
members executing trades in listed securities off the board; . . . 3) [t]he minimum commission
schedule; ... 4) [t]he uniform commission schedule for all transactions, regardless of size.
Id. at 481-82.
From 1963 until fixed commission rates were abolished in 1975, the organized exchanges lost a
significant amount of trading volume to the "third market." The term third market refers to over-
the-counter trading in exchange-listed securities by broker-dea1ers who are not exchange members.
The decline in market share ended with the elimination of fixed commissions, and by 1981 the SEC
concluded that the "competitive significance of the third market has been reduced to de minimis
levels." In re American Stock Exchange, Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17. 744 (Apr. 21, 1981)
(note 13); [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 82,866 n.13 (1981). But see infra text
accompanying notes 209-18.
58. See infra text accompanying notes 86-123.
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have rules that restrict their members from trading off the exchange or
"off-board."s9 These rules protect the so-called exchange specialists
from competition from other aggressive members of the same exchange.
Some commentators maintain that liquidity is enhanced when one
exchange member, known as a specialist trader or specialist, provides a
continuous market in the security in which he specializes.60 A specialist
perfonns two functions on an exchange. First, he makes a continuous
two-sided market in a particular stock. To do so, he must provide a sort
of "shock-absorber" for his special security, either in the fonn of actual
inventory holdings, or of willingness to move automatically into and out
of the futures market as required to clear the spot market.61 The special-
ist is required to maintain "in so far as is reasonably practicable. . . a
fair and orderly market on the exchange in the stocks in which he is so
acting."62 Assuring a fair and orderly market "implies the maintenance
of price continuity with reasonable depth"63 and the specialist's market
quotation "should be such that a transaction effected thereon . . . will
bear proper relation to preceding transactions and anticipated succeeding
transactions."64 Second, the exchange specialist handles "limit orders,"
open orders to buy or sell at prices other than the current market price.6S
For example, if the market for stock X is $10.00 bid, $10.50 offered, an
exchange member might place an order to sell at $11.00. The specialist
59. See, e.g., [1978] 2 N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 3651 (rule 390); [1981] 2 AM. STOCK Ex.
GUIDE (CCH) 2419 (rule 5); see also SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11,628,40 Fed. Reg. 41,808,
41,809-10 (1975) (describing the off-board trading restrictions on the Boston Stock Exchange, the
Chicago Board Options Exchange, the Cincinnati Stock Exchange, the Detroit Stock Exchange, the
Intermountain Stock Exchange, the Midwest Stock Exchange, the Pacific Stock Exchange, the PBW
Stock Exchange, and the Spokane Stock Exchange).
60. See infra text accompanying notes 229-35.
61. The term spot market is "[i]ndustry jargon for trades in commodities either for immediate
delivery (the same or the next business day) or for trades in futures contracts that will expire this
month." A. PESSIN & J. Ross, WORDS OF WALL STREET 241 (1984).
62. 2 Constitution and Rules, N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 2104.10, rule 104.10 (Aug. 1983).
The function of a member acting as regular specialist on the Floor of the Exchange includes, in
addition to the effective execution of commission orders entrusted to him, the maintenance, in
so far as reasonably practicable, of a fair and orderly market on the Exchange in the stocks in
which he is so acting.
Id. On the American Stock Exchange:
As a condition of a member's being registered as a specialist in one or more securities, it is to be
understood that, in addition to the execution of commission orders entrusted to him . . . a
specialist is to engage in a course of dealings for his own account to assist in the maintenance,
insofar as reasonably practicable, of a fair and orderly market on the Exchange in such securi-
ties .... 2 Constitution and Rules, AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 9310, rule l70(b) (May
1978).
63. 2 Constitution and Rules, N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 2104.10(1), rule 104.10(1) (Aug.
1983). This rule also notes that maintaining a fair and orderly market implies minimizing the effects
of temporary disparities between supply and demand. Id.
64. Id. at rule 104.10(4). See supra note 46 (citing text of rule).
65. The specialist has two obligations regarding his stewardship of the limit order book. First
he must not execute any orders at a price inferior to any price in the book. If, for example, a
customer has indicated a desire to sell stock at $11.00 per share, the specialist may not sell stock at a
price greater than $11.00 before executing the $11.00 trade recorded in the book. In addition, the
specialist must discharge the orders in the book on a first come, first served basis. See Poser, supra
note 26, at 927 n.237.
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enters this order in his book, and he will execute the order automatically
if the bid price for X reaches $11.00 (plus applicable commissions).
The ideal of an organized exchange is a continuous auction, where
buyers and sellers meet in a centralized location and continuously ex-
change price information. But, since sellers and buyers rarely appear si-
multaneously, the specialist system emerged to provide continuity and to
prevent abnormal fluctuations in the price of a security that are unrelated
to the value of the firm behind the security.66 In effect, specialists hold
and manage the inventories in the security market in much the same way
that a warehouse handles inventory for real commodities.
C. Securities Trading
The securities of a single company may be traded on more than one
stock exchange. A security comes to be traded on an exchange in one of
two ways. A company may file an application with the exchange and be
accepted for listing,61 Alternatively, subject to SEC approval,68 an ex-
change unilaterally can trade securities not listed on that exchange, re-
gardless of whether the issuer has applied for or even desires a listing
with the exchange. Once an exchange grants such "unlisted trading priv-
ileges," no member of that exchange may trade the security except on an
exchange.69 The SEC has discretion to approve or disapprove an ex-
change's decision to grant unlisted trading privileges.7o Axiomatic to the
idea of a national market system is the SEC's ability to eliminate all
needless restrictions on the trading of securities among markets and be-
tween exchanges. Unlisted trading privileges usually create unwarranted
trading restrictions. 71
D. Liquidity on the Over-the-Counter Market
The over-the-counter market is not a place at all, but just a phrase
that refers to three thousand firms with six thousand branch offices that
deal in securities transactions that do not take place on a stock ex-
change.72 There are no listing requirements for issues traded, and all
registered securities are entitled to participate.73 Brokers trade securities
over-the-counter via a complex telephone and telex communications sys-
66. 2 Constitution and Rules, N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 2104.10, rule 104.10(1) (Aug. 1983).
See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
67. In order to be accepted, the company must meet certain requirements regarding such
things as the extent of the public distribution of its shares and a minimum amount of assets. See,
e.g., 2 Constitution and Rules, N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) ~~ 2495, 2501, 2502, 2505 (1980); 2 Consti-
tution and Rules, AM. STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) ~ 10,001-10,010 (1974).
68. See 1934 Act § 12(0, 15 U.S.C. § 78 (1982).
69. [d. § 12(0, 15 U.S.C. § 78(/)(0.
70. [d. § 12(0 (2), 15 U.S.C. § 78(/)(0(2).
71. See infra text accompanying notes 86-113 (discussing off-board trading restrictions).
72. R. SOBEL, INSIDE WALL STREET 67 (1982); A. PESSIN & J. Ross, supra note 61, at 165.
73. J. CoHEN, E. ZINBARG & A. ZERKIL, INVESTMENT ANALYSIS AND PORTFOLIO MAN-
AGEMENT 83 (1982).
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tern, by which information is transmitted and trades are consummated.74
As Professor Loss has pointed out, "over-the-telephone" would be a
more accurate description of this market.75 The stocks of ninety percent
of all publicly held companies trade over-the-counter although the dollar
volume of such trading is only about five percent of the dollar volume of
organized exchanges.76
Virtually all brokerage firms that trade over-the-counter also are
members of at least one organized exchange. Because of the off-board
trading restrictions of the exchanges, a brokerage firm can only trade
over-the-counter shares of those companies that are not listed on the ex-
changes to which the brokerage firm belongs. Moreover, if a certain
stock is listed on any exchange, it can be listed ("dually traded") without
the company's request by other exchanges. Most important stocks,
therefore, are traded by all the major exchanges. The SEC's long-stand-
ing policy "has been to grant applications by stock exchanges for unlisted
trading privileges freely if the class of securities is already listed on an-
other exchange.'m Superficially, this dual trading seems to be a pro-
competitive policy. But a less obvious result of dual trading is that an
important stock, to be traded over-the-counter, can be traded no other
way, with rare exceptions. By the same token, if the stock is listed on an
exchange, it can only be traded on an exchange. Consequently, the seem-
ingly pro-competitive SEC policy actually divides stock trading into an
exchange segment and an over-the-counter segment, and the two seg-
ments cannot easily compete with each other to handle the securities of
any specified corporation.
The liquidity providing function that specialists perform on the ex-
changes is performed by market makers in the over-the-counter market.
In theory, market makers are individuals who hold themselves out as
willing to buy and sell a specific security for their own accounts "on a
regular or continuous basis."78 To be a market maker for securities of
any notable importance, however, traders must do more than merely
hold themselves out as occasionally willing to buy and sell. The traders
must actually provide operational bid and asked quotations for reason-
ably sized blocks of securities on a continuous basis, which means the
traders must undertake the same sort of inventory management that the
specialists do on an exchange. If a "market maker" does not perform
such functions, client~ther brokers who in turn deal directly with pri-
vate holders-will quickly tum to other market makers who do not
waste the clients' time through frequently fruitless contacts.
74. ld.
75. L. Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 675 n.F (1983).
76. R. SoBEL, INSIDE WALL STREET 67 (1982).
77. Poser, supra note 26, at 888-89; see also 1973 SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY, supra note
22, at 129-33.
78. 1934 Act § 3(a)(38), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(2)(38) (1976). ''The tenn 'market maker' means any
. . . dealer who, with respect to a security holds himself out. . . as being willing to buy and sell
such security for his own account on a regular or continuous basis." ld.
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E. The Black Box Concept
Complete automation through computerization is a third means by
which secondary market trading could take place. Potential buyers and
sellers could telephone-in their prices and the quantities they are pre-
pared to transact. Or, investors could enter that information directly
into the system from their offices or home computer terminals providing
there is assurance that they will stand behind their commitments. When
a purchase offer with a price exceeding that of a sales offer enters the
computer network, the transaction would be executed automatically.
Potential buyers and potential sellers could revise their offers at any time.
In addition, anyone could be a market maker, either by monitoring a
computer display, or by maintaining large limit buy and sell orders below
and above recent transactions.
On an experimental basis, the Cincinnati Stock Exchange (CSE) or-
ganized and maintains a completely computerized system.79 An SEC re-
port has noted that "[t]he NSTS [National Securities Trading System]
enables members of the CSE to participate in the system by entering bids
and offers into computer terminals for securities for their own account
and as agent for their customer's accounts. "80 Furthermore,
"[s]pecialists on the floor of an exchange linked to the NSTS can ...
enter bids and offers into the system in any NSTS Stock for which the
specialist is registered on [his own] exchange."81 The NSTS computer
system matches orders by price. The highest bid is matched with the
lowest offer. If two traders enter orders at the same price, the computer
will execute the orders on a first come, first served, time priority basis.82
v. THE NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM As A CONGRESSIONAL FREE
MARKET SOLUTION
In a pre-Carter fit of deregulatory zeal (or noise, at least), Congress
apparently tried to deregulate the securities marketplace by enacting the
Securities Acts Amendments of 1975.83 Interestingly, Congress never
defined the term national market system, which played such an impor-
tant role in the amendments. Instead, Congress articulated the basic
79. SEC DIRECTORATE OF EcONOMIC AND POLICY ANALYSIS, A REPORT ON THE OPERA-
TION OF THE CINCINNATI STOCK EXCHANGE NATIONAL SECURmES TRADING SYSTEM 1978-
1982, at i (1982).
80. [d. at 3.
81. [d. Presently only specialists on the floor of the Boston Stock Exchange participate in this
manner because only the Boston Exchange has NSTS terminals on its floor. [d.
82. SEC DIRECTORATE OF EcONOMIC AND POLICY ANALYSIS, A MONITORING REPORT ON
THE OPERATION OF THE CINCINNATI STOCK EXCHANGE NATIONAL SECURmES TRADING SYS-
TEM 4-5 (May 1981). A fully automated computer system, commonly referred to as an "exchange
withoul walls," is technologically feasible, yet might not be an acceptable replacement for today's
exchanges. For some stocks, trading activity is insufficient to insure that a buyer will be matched
with a seller. It is in this scenario that a system of specialists and market makers is necessary to
provide liquidity to the securities markets. See Poser, supra note 26, at 927.
83. Codified as IS U.S.C. §§ 78-78kk (1975).
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goals of the legislation, predicated upon congressional findings84 that new
data processing and communication techniques create the opportunity
for more efficient and effective market operations.85
Ironically, Congress entrusted the SEC, the organization responsible
for governing the present system, with the responsibility for dismantling
that very system. The actions that the SEC must take to achieve a na-
tional market system can be divided into two categories. First, the SEC
must eliminate exchange trading restrictions, so that market participants
will be able simultaneously to survey the conditions in multiple markets.
Second, the SEC must implement communications technology to facili-
tate trading activity among multiple markets. In essence, one can. jnter-
pret these goals as a congressional mandate that the free market govern
the manner in which securities are traded.
The SEC's efforts to implement the national market system are in-
consistent with Congress's stated intent. The SEC has not lifted the re-
strictions on intermarket competition. To the extent that the SEC has
implemented its mandate to facilitate a national market system at all, it
has done so in an ineffective fashion. If the effort is to succeed quickly,
the SEC will have to lift trading restrictions first, and then permit the
market participants to develop whatever communications technology the
needs of the market mandate. Instead, the SEC has attempted first to
oversee and control the development of these communications systems,
and then to lift trading restrictions. So long as the SEC prohibits market
participants from certain trading activities in the first place, the traders
have little incentive to use the newly developed communication facilities
to carry out the prohibited activities. This is true even in the unlikely
event that the SEC somehow is able to create the type of communications
system that would evolve naturally absent the SEC prohibitions.
A. Off-Board Trading Restrictions
Perhaps the most blatant example of the SEC's toleration of effi-
ciency inhibiting rules were the fixed commission rates set by the NYSE
until 1975.86 The commission rules required brokerage firms to charge
the same percentage commission for each share of a block of stock re-
84. 1934 Act § lIA(a)(I)A, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(I)(A) (1982) (Congress finds securities mar-
kets to be an "important national asset which must be preserved and strengthened").
85. [d. § llA(a)(I)B, 15 U.S.C. § 78k-l(a)(I)(B) (1976); see also text accompanying note 10.
86. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 56, at 21-1153. The SEC's enforcement of exchange fixed
commissions had long made the commission a target of criticism. See Demsetz, Perfect Competition,
Regulation, and the Stock Market, in EcONOMIC POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE
SECURITIES 1-23 (H. Manne ed. 1969); Stigler, Public Regulation of the Securities Markets, 37 J.
Bus. 117 (1964); West & Tinic, Minimum Commission Rates on New York Stock Exchange Transac-
tions, 2 BELL J. EcON. (1971); Baxter, supra note 5. For a careful analysis of the demise of fixed
commissions, see Jarrell, supra note I. Jarrell suggests that applying the political support maximiza-
tion theory of Stigler and Peltzman suggests that the SEC, as a "support maximizing regulator"
abandoned its defense of fixed rate commissions because the maximum net political support obtaina-
ble from redistributing the available wealth fell below "the political opportunity cost of the incre-
mental resources expended in implementing the regulations." [d. at 201.
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gardless of whether the block consisted of 100 shares or 1O,(X)() shares.8?
Unfortunately, even though the SEC has abolished fixed-rate commis-
sions, other similarly intrusive exchange rules, such as off-board trading
restrictions, mean that a national market system has had little opportu-
nity to evolve.
Off-board trading restrictions presently are in place at all the securi-
ties exchanges.88 These rules, which prevent exchange members from
87. Since the costs of processing these blocks of stock on the exchange is roughly equivalent,
or, at least, increases much less rapidly than the order size, the fixed commission rules prevented
sellers of large blocks of stock from realizing any scale economies. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note
56, at 295-312; see also Poser, supra note 26, at 896.
The fixed commission rules transferred real wealth from the people who bought and sold securi-
ties to the exchange members. The effect of these rules could have been ameliorated by allowing
institutions that bought and sold large quantities of securities to become exchange members. How-
ever, a rule, effective until 1980, limited NYSE membership to persons engaged primarily in the
business of trading securities. 2 Constitution and Rules, N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 3072, 3077 (1980).
Thus, insurance companies, mutual funds, and pension funds could not join the exchange to reduce
the costs of commissions. Between 1970 and 1976, fixed rate commissions disappeared. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 9079, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 1) 77,955, at
80,124; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 9007, [1970-71 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp.
(CCH) 1) 77,918, at 80,047. The SEC first prohibited any minimum commissions on orders in excess
of $500,000. In 1975, commission rates paid by public customers became subject to negotiation and
in 1976 minimum commission rates paid by exchange members were abolished.
During the halcyon days of fixed rate commissions there was a marked increase in the extent to
which securities listed on the NYSE were bought and sold on the regional stock exchanges and in
"the third market." (Over-the-counter trading in securities listed on stock exchanges is commonly
referred to as "third market" trading.) See [1973] SEC ANNUAL REPORT 156. The reason for this
migration of trading was that these alternative forums provided a greater opportunity for price cuts
to institutional investors, Le. they were a means of avoiding exchange rules. 4 SEC INSTITUTIONAL
INVESTOR STUDY REPORT, H.R. Doc. No. 64, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 11,822-24 (1971); SUBCOMM.
ON SECURITIES OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 93D
CONG., 1ST SESS., SECURITIES INDUSTRY STUDY 89, 92-93 (Comm. Print 1973). In 1971, more
than 17% of the trading in NYSE listed stocks occurred outside of that exchange. Id.
The effect of the NYSE's loss of business was, according to the Exchange, detrimental to the
marketplace generally. Specifically, members expressed concern that the marketplace for securities
was becoming "fragmented" because "investors and broker dealers increasingly had to consider mul-
tiple trading forums" to execute a single order. Parker & Becker, Unlisted Trading Privileges, 14
REV. SEC. REG. 853, 856 (1981). By forum shopping broker-dealers "transported trades" to re-
gional exchanges to effect various reciprocal arrangements with institutions. Id. This market shop-
ping allegedly took time due to poor communications between markets. The Exchange allegedly
worried that smaller investors might not receive prompt attention to their orders. Also, traders who
were unaware of market activity in a particular stock, would be unwilling to quote competitive or
"tight" markets for these securities due to a lack of sufficient information. (A tight market is one
with a narrow spread between the bid and offered sides.) Id.
88. The NYSE required that: "Except as otherwise provided by this Rule, no member [or]
member organization . . . shall effect any transaction in any listed stock in the over-the-counter
market, either as principal or agent." 2 Constitution and Rules, N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 1) 2390, rule
390(a) (Jan. 1983). On the American Stock Exchange: "Except as hereafter provided by this Rule,
no (i) member, [or] (ii) member organization ... shall effect any transition in the over-the-counter
market in any equity security admitted to dealings on the exchange." 2 Constitution and Rules, AM.
STOCK Ex. GUIDE (CCH) 1) 9225, rule 5(a) (Feb. 1981). See also OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 26,
at 13. ("The other exchanges have similarly restrictive rules.") Securities Exchange Act Release No.
7628. Amendment or Abrogation ofExchange Off-Board Trading Rules, 40 Fed. Reg. 41,808 (1975)
(Notice of Rulemaking Proceeding) [hereinafter cited as Exchange Off-Board Trading Rules] ("All
the nation's registered securities exchanges have rules which are specifically intended to limit or
condition the ability of a member to effect transactions over-the-counter in securities listed, or admit-
ted to unlisted trading privileges on the exchanges.").
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trading exchange-listed stocks off of the exchange, severely limit, and in
some cases prohibit, outside market makers from competing with the
specialists on the organized exchanges.89 Off-board trading rules prevent
firms from executing trades privately, such as over the telephone. Trad-
ers must bring all trades to the floor of an exchange where the transac-
tions are subject to the exchange's commissions.90 When traders
negotiate transactions before bringing them to the exchange floor, and
only bring the transactions to the exchange because of off-board trading
restrictions, the traders must nonetheless pay the specialist's commission.
The only effect of such off-board trading restrictions is an artificial trans-
fer of wealth, from nonexchange members to the exchange member who
receives a commission on the transaction.
These off-board trading rules have several effects on trading. First,
if a broker-dealer has a customer willing to sell a security for $1,000, and
another customer willing to buy that security for $1,000, the broker can-
not simply execute the transaction in-house, but must go through an ex-
change. Second, if a customer is willing to sell shares of a security for no
less than $1,000, but the exchange's bid is only $999, the broker cannot
sell the customer's shares to an over-the-counter market maker whose
bid is higher. Finally, the rule prevents a third market maker from sell-
ing directly to a member of the exchange.
Although these off-board trading rules increase transactions costs
and transfer wealth to exchange members, Congress did not eliminate the
rules in 1975 when it passed the national market system legislation. In-
stead, Congress directed the SEC to review the rules,91 report the results
of the review to Congress within ninety days,92 and amend any rule im-
posing a burden on commerce that did not appear to be necessary or
appropriate,93 including all rules that limit or condition the ability of
members to effect transactions in securities other than on exchanges.94
The SEC's ninety day review catalogued the exchanges' off-board trading
practices and opined that "[t]he rules of the exchanges ... appear to
engender anticompetitive effects in certain important respects.,,95
Thus, the SEC has concluded that off-board trading restrictions are
incompatible with the concept of a competitive national market system.96
89. OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 26, at 13.
90. See SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 56, at 316-18.




95. Exchange Off-Board Trading Rules, supra note 88, at 41,811. See also id. at 41,808 ("[t]he
Commission has concluded that off-board trading rules of exchanges impose burdens on
competition").
96. See OVERSIGHT STUDY, supra note 26, at 14 (emphasis added):
Despite the fundamental purpose of the 1975 Amendments to eliminate unnecessary restraints
on competition, these restrictive rules and practices, though modified, continue in place today.
This is inconsistent with a central thrust of the legislation and the manner contemplated for
bringing a national market system into being. Not only is it at odds with the underlying legista-
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If there are prohibitions on members of one exchange from trading freely
in a security with nonmembers-even if the nonmember is offering a bet-
ter price97-the market cannot achieve the basic goals of the national
market system legislation. Off-board trading restrictions also prevent
other exchange members from competing with specialists and nonmem-
ber market makers in making two-sided markets in exchange-listed se-
curities.98 Therefore, as the SEC has previously recognized, off-board
trading rules "deprive the securities markets of the benefits that might
otherwise accrue from enhancement of competition among market mak-
ers and the commitment of additional capital and professional skill to the
market making function."99 Despite the SEC's recognition that off-
board trading restrictions unnecessarily or inappropriately burden com-
petition in conflict with the purposes of the 1934 Act,l°O the SEC contin-
ues to impose such restrictions.
The 1975 national market system legislation empowers the SEC to
amend the rules of any exchange or other self-regulatory organization at
will "to insure the fair administration of the self-regulatory organization,
[or] to conform its rules to requirements of this title ...."101 This
means, of course, that the SEC has the plenary authority to eliminate off-
board trading restrictions. 102 The SEC, however, has eliminated few of
these restrictions.
In 1976, the SEC took a step towards deregulation by passing rule
19c-l,103 which required the exchanges to eliminate rules restricting trad-
ers to executing agency transactions on the exchange. I04 Unfortunately,
this change had virtually no effect on the marketplace, because broker-
dealers still could not purchase stock for their own accounts, as a princi-
tive technique-to enhance competition--but the data regarding trading indicates competition
has not grown.
97. And, of course, even if the basic price is the same but the transactions costs are lower, the
trade is best consummated "off board."
98. Exchange Off-Board Trading Rules, supra note 88, at 41,808.
99. 41 Fed. Reg. 4511 (1976).
100. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,628,40 Fed. Reg. 41,808 (1975) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. 240) (proposing rule 19c-3); Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,362, 42 Fed. Reg.
33,510,33,515 (1977) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240) (proposing rule 19c-2).
101. 1934 Act § 19(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78s(c) (1982).
102. In fact, it is likely that the SEC has had such authority since 1934. In promulgating the
Securities Exchange Act, Congress intended to give the Commission expansive regulatory authority.
Werner, Adventure in the Social Control ofFinance: The National Market System for Securities, 75
COLUM. L. REv. 1233, 1254-55 (1975) (arguing that the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 gave the
SEC the "economic authority" to fundamentally alter "market or industry relationships").
103. Rule 19c-1 provides that:
the rules of each national securities exchange shall provide that no rule, stated policy or practice
of that exchange shall prohibit or condition . . . the ability of any member acting as agent to
affect transactions on any other exchange or over-the-counter with a third market maker or
nonmember block positioner. . . .
SEC rule 19c-I, 17 C.F.R. § 24O.19c-1 (1981).
104. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11,942,41 Fed. Reg. 4507 (1976) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. 240 (1981» (adopting rule 19c-l).
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pal,105 and could not execute in-house agency crosses.106 In other words,
the exchanges still barred the broker-dealers from providing the inven-
tory management functions necessary in a continuous market. Trades
may take place outside of the confines of the exchange only as long as the
number of middlemen is not reduced-hardly an effective means of de-
creasing transaction costs or enhancing liquidity. Therefore, exchange
members still cannot compete with specialists as market makers. Rule
19c-l did permit a market maker, who wanted to buy a stock through an
exchange member, to choose between going directly to the exchange or
going to the exchange member. The exchange member, however, could
only act as agent for some other party. Exchange members who receive
orders rarely have at hand offsetting orders, so they still have to obtain
the securities on the exchange. Thus, rule 19c-l is of little value, and
traders seldom use it. 107
Rule 19c-2, which the SEC proposed on June 27, 1977, would have
removed all remaining off-board trading restrictions. 108 The rule would
have eliminated restrictions on principal transactions and in-house
agency crosses by January 1, 1978. 109 Lifting the exchanges' restrictions
on principal transactions was particularly significant in improving the
liquidity of the secondary market for securities. Allowing exchange
members to consummate trades as principals would permit them to be-
come market makers, and to compete with the specialists of the ex-
change. For example, if the exchange specialist was quoting a market of
$19 bid and $21 offered, and an exchange member was willing to buy the
stock at $19-118 as principal outside of the exchange, the transaction at
19-118 would seemingly enhance liquidity and avoid any needless trans-
action costs.
105. One who purchases stock "as principal" purchases such stock "for his own account and
risk." A. PESSIN & J. Ross, supra note 72, at 184.
106. 17 C.F.R. 240 (1976) ("Rule 19c-1 will not prevent exchanges from having rules restricting
exchange members from effecting transactions 'in-house' as agent for both buyers and sellers or with
persons other than a qualified third market maker or block positioner.").
107. Parker, Off-Board Trading Restrictions, 13 REV. SEC. REG. 921 n.21 (1980).
108. Securities Exchange Act Release Act No. /3,662,42 Fed. Reg. 33,528 (1977) (to be codified
at 17 C.F.R. 240).
109. Proposed Rule 19c-2 provided that:
After December 31, 1977, the rules of each national securities exchange shall provide as follows:
(a) No rule, stated policy or practice of this exchange shall prohibit or condition, or be
construed to prohibit, condition or otherwise limit, directly or indirectly, the ability of any
member acting as agent for both buyer and seller to effect any cross transaction otherwise than
on this exchange in any reported exchange security.
(b) No rule, stated policy or practice of this exchange shall prohibit, condition, or be con-
strued to prohibit, condition, or otherwise limit, directly or indirectly, the ability of any member
acting as principal to effect any transaction otherwise than on this exchange with any person in
any reported exchange security.
(c) For purposes of this rule, the term "reported exchange security" shall mean any equity
security listed on this exchange or to which unlisted trading privileges on this exchange has
been extended as to which last sale information is reported in the consolidated transaction re-
porting system.
[d.
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However, the SEC withdrew proposed Rule 19c-2 in June 1980, llO
and instead adopted a more restrictive rule. Rule 19c-3 111 totally elimi-
nated off-board trading restrictions for a limited number of stocks on an
experimental basis. The SEC, even when proposing rule 19c-2, was con-
cerned that too much freedom in the marketplace might be detrimen-
tal. 112 The Commission was particularly concerned with three
phenomena: fragmentation of orders, overreaching, and market surveil-
lance. 113 These considerations are the only policy reasons that the SEC
has advanced in defense of its failure to ban off-board trading
restrictions.
B. A Stigler-Peltzman Analysis ofSEC Action
Interestingly, the SEC's stated concerns about the national market
system, which mirror the NYSE's policy arguments, are identical to the
arguments that were posited in favor of retaining fixed-rate commis-
sions. 114 One naturally wonders why the SEC's actions vis-a-vis the na-
tional market system have been so sluggish, compared to their prompt
moves to abolish fixed-rate commissions. At this point, a careful exami-
nation of the findings of the SEC's chief economist, Gregg Jarrell, pro-
vides some insightYs
The Stigler-Peltzman modePI6 that Jarrell uses envisions political
equilibrium in an environment where every force for change is resisted by
an exactly equal counterforce. If this were not true, then political institu-
tions would continue to change, whereas they seem to move rarely, but
abruptly, compared with market fluctuations. To be concrete, Jarrell ar-
gues that brokers as a group favored even higher and more rigid fixed-
rate commissions than the SEC would enforce. The SEC's counterforce
arose from opposition to higher rates by traders and a subset of broker-
age firms. 117
To illustrate the force-counterforce analysis a simple diagram may
help. Figure 1 shows the demand for brokerage services and the margi-
nal cost of the resources consumed to produce the services. In an unreg-
ulated competitive industry, the quantity produced would be C, and the
equilibrium commission charged would equal marginal cost. A well-
known economic truism asserts that the competitive outcomes do not
maximize industry profits. 118 This can be readily demonstrated by exam-
110. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,889, 17 C.F.R. 240 (1980).
Ill. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16.888,45 Fed. Reg. 41,125 (1980) (to be codified at
17 C.F.R. 240).
112. 17 C.F.R. 240 (1977). See Poser, supra note 26, at 935. (The Commission acknowledged
that elimination of these restrictions might be accompanied by adverse effects on the markets.)
113. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,662,42 Fed. Reg. 33,510, 33,515 (1977).
114. See supra note 87.
115. See Jarrell, supra note I.
116. See supra note I and accompanying text.
117. Jarrell, supra note I, at 284-86, 298.
118. See A. ALCHIAN & W. ALLEN, EXCHANGE & PRODUCTION: COMPETITION, CooRDlNA-
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ining the marginal revenue curve. If the commission rate is increased
sufficiently to curtail one transaction, the industry saves more in cost
than it loses in revenue, because the marginal revenue is less than margi-
nal cost. Indeed, as drawn in Figure 1, brokerage industry revenue actu-
ally increases at first as transactions fall below the competitive level
because the percentage increase in price is large relative to the percentage
fall in transactions. Hence, one can measure the marginal increase in
brokerage profits by the distance between the marginal cost and marginal
revenue curves, and this can serve as a proxy for measuring the enthusi-
asm of brokers in seeking SEC enforcement of higher rates. Clearly, the
broker support becomes relatively weak before the commission rates are
driven all the way to the level at which cartel profits will be maximized.
At the same time, with SEC enforcement of ever higher rates, there
is increasing opposition from traders to further increases in rates. The
traders bear a cost from increased rates that exceeds the transfer to bro-
kers, because noncompetitive commission rates create the well-known
deadweight efficiency costs usually associated with cartelization. 119 The
independent traders must be more difficult to organize than the ex-
nON & CONTROL 263-80 (3d ed. 1983) (ifthe owners of the entire supply ofa product could agree to
restrict output, they would reap greater income).
119. The source of this deadweight loss is the ability of the members of the successful cartel to
set price above marginal cost. Some of this price increase is a simple redistribution of income from
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change-member brokers, or the SEC-enforced broker cartel would never
have begun. The reduced interests of the well-organized brokers in ever
higher commissions, coupled with the increased resistance from the
poorly-organized traders, yields some political equilibrium commission
rates that are between marginal cost and the profit-maximizing level.
This equilibrium will persist as long as the political environment remains
unchanged. .
The political environment did change in ways that were adverse to
fixed commissions. First, institutional investors, such as mutual funds,
grew rapidly in importance as security holders. 12o The institutional in-
vestors were a more easily organized group than the smaller, more wide-
spread members of the public who held securities. Thus institutional
investors could more easily mobilize their opposition to the SEC enforce-
ment of high commissions. Second, the institutional members had better
substitute markets than did the public. For example, institutional hold-
ers can afford to contact each other directly when they want to trade tens
of thousands of shares, whereas an individual wishing to buy or sell a few
hundred shares can rarely afford such time or telephone bills. The ability
to trade shares directly between institutions reduced the interest of bro-
kers in high commission rates' as Figure 2 demonstrates. The demand
curve became more elastic, leading to the brokers' reduced interest.
High rates were driving some institutional business off the exchange.
Clearly, the marginal cost-marginal revenue difference, which drives the
broker's interest in artificially high commissions, was reduced. Third,
some brokerage firms were becoming hostile to the fixed commissions.
The rule constrained brokers who were better able to service the low
commission rate yet high volume business. Moreover, the rules put such
brokers at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis firms that were better
equipped to compete by providing non-price related attributes, such as
investment advice,'21 Eventually, the combined strength of these forces
induced the SEC to abolish the fixed-rate commissions. 122
No similar fate seems likely in the near future for the rules that
hamper the development of the national market system. In particular,
the national market system would primarily benefit small-holding mem-
the consumer to the cartelizer; the rest, however, represents a net loss of benefits to society, which is
known as deadweight loss. M. BRADLEY, MICROECONOMICS 270 (1980).
120. Jarrell, supra note I, at 277-79; see Figure I.
121. Jarrell, using the capital asset pricing model, shows that the national full-line firms-
Bache, E. F. Hutton, Merrill Lynch, Paine Webber, and Dean Witter Reynolds-benefited from the
1975 deregulation of fixed commission rates. Jarrell's results "imply a cumulative gain from deregu-
lation of about 150%." Jarrell, supra note I, at 298. This is not surprising. When fixed commis-
sions were abandoned, commissions to institutions declined sharply, and commissions to individual
(public) customers rose sharply. In the case of off-board trading restrictions, these firms would be
joined by firms such as Salomon Brothers, Morgan Stanley and Lehman Brothers, all of which
derive significant revenue from trading activity. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16.889,45 Fed.
Reg. 41,156 (1980) (withdrawing proposed rule 19c-2).
122. Jarrell, supra note I, at 307.
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bers of the public, not large institutional investors, for two reasons.
First, the holdings of institutional investors are so massive that these in-
vestors already have incentive to monitor the entire market privately.
While a centralized system might be somewhat cheaper even for institu-
tional investors, the cost savings to these large investors would be more
modest than the savings for members of the public, who presently have
no good alternative to broker-provided information. Second, institutions
deal in such massive transactions that they frequently can transact only
with each other. They would probably turn to a market maker only
when they need to put together, or disperse, a block from, or to, the
general public. Consequently, information detailing public transactions
prices are of minor interest to institutional investors because the volumes
are too small to generate institutional interest.
Consequently, the only well-organized interest that strongly favors
the national market system is a subset of brokerage firms, probably the
large national brokerage houses that do not man the specialist posts on
the various exchanges. While it is certainly not impossible that these
houses will someday gain political superiority over the specialist houses,
the lack of institutional allies has delayed the national market system
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reforms. 123 Consistent with this analysis, the Commission has an-
nounced that it does not plan to take any further steps "in the near fu-
ture" toward repeal of the remaining off-board trading restrictions. 124
C SEC Reservations About Removing Off-Board Trading Restrictions
1. Fragmentation of Orders
The first of the SEC's fears about removing off-board trading restric-
tions is "fragmentation,'tl2S which reflects a variety of concerns about the
consequences of a significant amount of trading occurring outside of the
organized exchanges. Particularly, the SEC noted that increased market
making outside the exchanges will divert the flow of orders in listed se-
curities away from existing market centers, including particularly the pri-
mary exchanges. 126 The SEC apparently thinks that such a diversion of
order flow is necessarily bad. The SEC alleges that this diversion will
impair pricing efficiency and lead to a decline in the quality of brokerage
services as it becomes unclear where a buyer can obtain the best price. 127
But even with off-board trading restrictions, orders flow from one ex-
change to another (although usually not from one exchange to an over-
the-counter trader) because orders naturally gravitate to the best prices.
If there is no problem with one exchange supplanting another-and the
SEC does not allege one-then the SEC should allow, or even encourage,
an off-exchange market maker who is willing to pay more for a security
to. dive~ sell orders away from the exchange. One can even question
whether assuring investors that they have the best price available is in
their interests, given that the cost of that assurance directly depreciates
that best price; in other words, when the assurance increases prices when
the investors buy and depresses prices when the investors sell.
.: :. Moreover, without off-board trading restrictions, certain brokerage
firms will inevitably hold themselves out as offering the best available
.prices for securities because of the advantages such a policy offers in
c'ompeting for clients. Competitive pressures will force other firms to
follow suit. Merely requiring market makers to list their bid and asked
sic;leS on the .computerized quotation systems already in place will solve
both tl)e problems of impaired pricing efficiency and the declining quality
. .:.
123. Another very strong indicator of the lack of uniformity of interests among exchange mem-
bers~ith r.e.spect to the NMS is the Commission's behavior with regard to certain stocks that it has
exempted from off-board trading restrictions. Certain large traders objected strenuously to exchange
listing, and the concomitant application of off-board trading restrictions for certain securities, be-
cawesuch listing would result in a diminution of profitable trading activity by such firms. Ulti-
niat~y. tli~· objections led the SEC to implement rule 19c-3. See infra notes 189-96 and
acoompariyingtext. .'
124. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16,889,45 Fed. Reg. 41,156 (1980) (withdrawing pro-
posed rule 19c-2).
125. Sometimes the word fragmentation is used more specifically to refer to the dispersion of
orders among market centers. SEC Exchange Act Release No. 16,888, at I n.32 (1980).
'126. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13.662, 42 Fed. Reg. 33,510, 33,515 (1977).
127; . ld,
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of brokerage services. Obviously firms acting as market makers must
have accurate, up-to-the-minute information on transactions. Conse-
quently they will have every incentive to communicate with one another,
as happens in the markets that function without exchanges. For exam-
ple, both the municipal bond and the United States government securities
markets function quite well with dozens of market makers spread from
coast to coast. The markets for major issues are highly liquid and com-
munication has not been a problem. 128
The January 1, 1984 split up of the American Telephone and Tele-
graph Company (AT&T) into eight holding companies,129 provides fur-
ther support for the proposition that the SEC's fragmentation argument
is without merit. The split up provided a bonanza of trading activity in
rule 19c-3 stocks. The high volume of trading activity resulted from mil-
lions of shares "changing hands as investors rearrange their portfo-
liOS.,,130 Owners of "old" AT&T stock received a mix of shares in the
regional companies. 131 While all these stocks are traded on the New
York Stock Exchange and five regional exchanges,132 seven of the eight
new stocks are not subject to off-board trading restrictions. 133 Conse-
quently, large trading concerns can trade these stocks without going
through a specialist on the exchange.
A comparison by price and time of every trade in these seven stocks
reveals that fragmentation is an unwarranted fear. Round lot blocks of a
particular stock traded at any given time sold at precisely the same price
regardless of whether it was traded over-the-counter, on the New York
Stock Exchange, or on a regional exchange. 134 These results are not sur-
prising. If a price differential had existed between exchanges, arbitrage
between these markets would have eliminated such differentials. Clearly,
not everyone needs separate price quotations from every market; a few
self-interested arbitragers assure that traders need only worry about one
national price.
128. See C. HENNING, W. PIGOTT & R. SCOTT, FINANCIAL MARKETS AND THE EcONOMY 307
(2d ed. 1978) (bids for "intermediate-size and large-size" municipal bond issues are "quite competi-
tive"); id. at 248 ("treasury bills ... have a high degree of liquidity").
129. See infra text accompanying notes 208-17.
130. Blumstein, Trade Set in 8 Companies. N.Y. Times, Nov. 18, 1983, at DI (Business), col. 3.
131. For every 10 shares of "old" AT&T stock owned, investors received one share in each of
the regional holding companies and 10 shares of the "new" AT&T. Investors were not given a
choice as to the mix of shares he or she would like to receive, although owners of fewer than 10
shares of the "old" AT&T received cash rather than shares in the regional holding companies. See
Main, AT&T's Holiday Gift to Wall Street, FORTUNE, Nov. 28, 1983, at 67.
132. Blumstein, supra note 130, at DI7, col. I.
133. See supra text accompanying notes 86-100 (discussion of off-board trading restrictions).
134. Information on the price, time, and trading volume of the seven regional holding company
stocks was compiled by Francis Emory Fitch, Inc., 130 Cedar Street, New York, N.Y. 10006 [here-
inafter cited as Fitch Research]. The right to use this information covering the month of February
1984 was purchased with research funds provided by the Emory University School of Law. The
conclusions in the text are based on .this extensive data, which covers every trade in those stocks
during the relevant period.
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2. Overreaching or The "Internalization of Order Flow" Fallacy
The SEC has also voiced concern over the possibility of "internaliza-
tion," which refers to "withholding of retail orders from other market
centers for the purpose of executing them 'in-house' as principal, without
exposing those orders to buying and selling interests in those other mar-
ket centers." I3S Commentators have cited the fear that relaxing off-
board trading restrictions will result in internalization of orders as the
major reason the SEC should keep such restrictions in place. 136 Propo-
nents of this argument consider the danger of internalization to be that
"[i]nternalizing order flow might create a conflict of interest between the
broker's 'legal responsibility to seek best execution for their customers'
and their desire to' maximize profits from market making activities."137
Furthermore, this conflict might cause some firms to 'overreach'138 their
customers by executing retail transactions as principal at prices less
favorable to those customers than if the firm had acted as agent. 139
For example, a customer might call up a broker-dealer and ask to
buy 500 shares of stock X. A market maker at another firm might be
offering the stock for $12.00 per share, but the broker-dealer, who has
the stock in inventory, might sell the stock to the customer for $14.00
rather than selling as agent for $12.00 (plus the broker's commission of
less than $2.(0).
This simple analysis, to which the SEC subscribes, ignores several
factors, however, that mitigate the danger of such overreaching. First,
the SEC already requires that the broker-dealer disclose both the amount
of any "mark-up, mark-down, or similar remuneration" if the broker-
dealer acts as principal but not as a market makerl40 and whether the
broker-dealer is a market maker in that security.141 These requirements
enable customers to identify those instances in which overreaching is a
danger. Second, the broker-dealer's failure to disclose knowledge of a
lower price elsewhere would clearly violate rule lOb-5, the SEC's strin-
gent antifraud provision. 142 Curiously, the SEC apparently believes that
off-board trading can be policed, but that this sort of fraud cannot.
Furthermore, sensible brokers will not jeopardize a long-standing
relationship with a customer for the chance to turn a quick profit on one
dubious transaction, particularly when the brokers likely will be discov-
ered, damage their reputations, and possibly lose their licenses. Finally,
the market already adequately disperses relevant information in a way
135. Securities Exchange Commission Release No. 16,888, at 18 n.31 (1980).
136. See Parker, supra note 107, at 919-20.
137. [d. at 920.
138. Overreaching simply means not providing customers with the best price for a security. See
Securities Exchange Commission Release No. 16,888, at 19 n.33 (1980).
139. See Parker, supra note 107, at 920.
140. 17 C.F.R. 24O.IOb-lO(a)(8)(i) (1984).
141. [d. 24O.10b-IO(a)(8)(ii).
142. Chasins v. Smith Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1172 (2d Cir. 1970).
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that enables customers to know the relevant prices at which trades were
made, enabling customers to detect and prosecute overreaching quickly.
Newspapers print stock prices, and institutional investors have up-to-the-
minute price information from a large variety of sources, most notably
institutional salesmen. For modest cost, any suspicious public small-
holding investor can, even now, obtain nearly current price quotations
for major securities. 143
In the face of all these checks, presumably at least some firms will
establish and maintain a reputation for not engaging in questionable
practices. If the natural evolution of the brokerage business provides
some "honest firms," one must question whether there is adequate reason
to employ people at the SEC merely to prevent some investors from us-
ing "dishonest" firms. The legal system might function more cheaply if
the customers handled the occasional damages from internalization ret-
rospectively through tort suits, rather than having a regulatory agency
handle all such possible damages prospectively. Obviously agency sui-
cide is unappealing to the SEC, but that distaste ought not concern the
public, nor a public-spirited Congress. 144
A related problem associated with both internalization and fragmen-
tation145 is that "a number of the largest, best capitalized member firms
could seize the opportunity to make regular two-sided over-the-counter
markets in the most actively traded exchange-listed securities, withdraw-
ing the major portion of their order flow from [the] exchanges."146 How
a firm could profit from making such massive inroads on the exchanges is
unclear, but why the public should care if a firm could succeed in this
fashion is even more unclear. The strategy would succeed only if the
firm could offer the public a better deal through internal sources than
other firms could offer over an exchange.
The SEC has further hypothesized that a firm might only execute
customer's orders in relatively inactive stocks if the firm could line up a
customer on the other side of the transaction in advance, and thereby
143. These current price quotations are obtained simply by calling one's stockbroker and asking
for the current bid and asked spread for the security in question. The stockbroker has an incentive
to provide a competitive spread in order to maximize the probability of consummating a trade
through which a commission can be earned.
144. In implementing the national market system legislation, the SEC implicitly is taking the
position that the optimal number of "dishonest" transactions in the securities market is zero, but it is
not. Starting with the most blatant cases of abuse, an efficient legal system will try to ferret out
dishonesty only as long as the cost of preventing the next abuse (the economist's term here is the
marginal cost of prevention) is no greater than the expected damage that will be done to society by
that abuse (the marginal benefit of prevention). The marginal cost in the SEC's scenario presumably
includes substantial sums funneled through the SEC budget, although in a more efficient system the
resources will likely be concentrated in private tort suits instead. Consequently, seeking optimal
prevention of abuse, rather than total prevention, will admittedly reduce the influence of the SEC,
but that is a legitimate concern only of SEC employees. The small amounts that the public would
lose in the occasional abuses the SEC predicted, it would more than recoup in reduced expenditures
on the regulatory bureaucracy.
145. See supra text accompanying notes 125-34.
146. 41 Fed. Reg. 4513 (1976).
HeinOnline -- 1985 U. Ill. L. Rev. 345 1985
No.2] NATIONAL MARKET SYSTEM 345
execute the deal on a risk free basis. Why a firm would be motivated to
do this is unclear, however. There are only three possible ways for a
brokerage firm to react to buyer requests. First, a firm might make a
market in a particular security, rendering the SEC's concern unfounded,
for the firm itself will handle any transactions involving that security.
Second, a firm might not make a market in that security, but some other
firm will. If so, the first firm will have no incentive to refuse the cus-
tomer's order and commission, as all the risk is borne by the second firm,
the market maker. Indeed, there is no evidence that firms currently re-
fuse to broker one-sided business in securities presently handled by mar-
ket makers over-the-counter. Finally, if the initial firm does refuse the·
business, nothing prevents the customer from going to another firm (pre-
sumably in a huff). If no firm makes a market in a certain security, cus-
tomers still will have to go to the exchange specialist, but not because of
SEC regulations. Rather, the exchanges will be natural monopolies in
such securities.
Natural monopolies would invariably involve small, obscure (need
we say unexciting) securities with markets too thin to attract market
makers. 147 Rather ironically, the present exchanges began operation
with such securities; in colonial times all securities were thinly traded
compared to modern securities. It is for these modern thinly traded se-
curities that the exchanges still have a clear function to serve. Paradoxi-
cally, it is just such securities that the largest exchanges now refuse to
list. If the exchanges are not listing thinly traded securities today, the
fact that perhaps they may continue not to list such securities even if the
SEC changes the rules merely trivializes the whole premise for the SEC's
argument.
In sum, internalizing orders is actually a positive aspect of removing
off-board trading restrictions. Such internalization reduces transaction
costs, and thereby increases the efficiency of the market, so long as the
trading records are made public. If internalization does not reduce costs,
no firm competing with all the other firms in the market will be able to
attract or keep clients while forcing on them an inefficient and costly
policy of internalization.
3. Market Surveillance
Industry groups, particularly the exchanges, have vociferously ar-
gued that if the SEC removes off-board trading restrictions and large
numbers of transactions move off the organized exchanges, such changes
will diminish the SEC's ability to police the markets. 148 The SEC pre-
147. This would, of course, involve exactly the opposite configuration we see today, where only
the largest, most inherently liquid stocks may be listed on the N.Y.S.E. See infra text accompanying
note 164.
148. Proceeding before the SEC "In the Matter of Rules of National Securities Exchanges
Which Limit or Condition the Ability of Members to Effect Transactions Otherwise Than on Such
Exchanges," SEC FILE No. 4-180, at 22-23, 83 (Association for the Preservation of the Auction
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sently has sophisticated "market monitoring techniques designed to iden-
tify instances of unusual trading activity" in exchange transactions. 149 In
essence, this means that the SEC has computers that record stock trans-
actions. When a corporation makes an episodic announcement, such as a
tender offer bid or a dramatic quarterly earnings report, the SEC tracks
previous trading activity in the relevant stock in the hope of ferreting out
insider trading.
The SEC claims that eliminating off-board trading restrictions will
require it to develop transactional audit trail procedures sufficient to ful-
fill the SEC's monitoring responsibilities. ISO Perhaps a complete answer
to this concern is that the SEC has never claimed that it could not de-
velop such procedures and, in fact, the SEC has argued on other occa-
sions that "it is unclear that over-the-counter transactions are
intrinsically more difficult to monitor than exchange transactions."lsl
Thus, stocks presently traded over-the-counter seemingly do not now
pose market surveillance problems of greater magnitude than exchange-
traded stockS. IS2 Even the small minority of exchange-listed stocks that
the SEC does not currently subject to off-board trading restrictions, the
so-called 19c-3 stocks, do not pose monitoring problems. 153 The National
Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (NASD) has a Market Surveil-
lance Department with computer facilities that monitor all transactions
reported on the consolidated tape through the National Association of
Securities Dealers Automated Quotations (NASDAQ) system. IS4 Under
the NASD's bylaws, all transactions in securities executed "otherwise
than on exchange" must be reported through the NASDAQ Transaction
Reporting System. ISS All off-board dealer transactions are subject to the
NASD's Market Surveillance Department's regulatory monitoring pro-
gram. Therefore, if such surveillance is even necessary, the SEC can look
to the ample monitoring facilities already in place.
Finally, the plethora of private remedies under the securities laws
provides a veritable army of potential plaintiffs to insure that firms will
not cheat purchasers in off-exchange transactions. ls6 If a dishonest bro-
Market), 1086-87 (New York Stock Exchange), 271a, 292, 329-30 (Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner &
Smith), 561 (National Association of Investment Clubs), 830, 847 (American Stock Exchange)
(1975).
149. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,662,42 Fed. Reg. 33,510, 33,522 (1977) (proposing
rule 19c-2; to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240.19c-2).
150. Id.
151. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11.942,41 Fed. Reg. 4507, 4512 (1976).
152. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 11.942.41,41 Fed. Reg. 4507, 4512 (1976). The Asso-
ciation's current ability to amass information on the place, price, and time of off-exchange transac-
tions is testimony to the fact that there is ample market surveillance for over-the-counter stocks.
Moreover, this information is publicly available, for a price. See supra note 134.
153. See supra note Ill.
154. Statement of Gordon S. Macklin, President of the National Association of Securities Deal-
ers, Inc., 10 the Hearings of the Securities Exchange Commission on Off-Board Trading Restrictions
9 (Aug. 16, 1977) (on file with the University of I/Iinois Law Review).
155. Id.
156. The most well known private remedy is SEC Rule 1Ob-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.1Ob-5 (1979).
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ker should slip through the SEC surveillance, for example, the injured
customer could, under the right circumstances, bring a rule lOb-5 fraud
suit. 157
D. Efficient Markets
The real potential danger from both market fragmentation and in-
ternalization of order flow is that the securities markets might become
less efficient because only a fraction of trading activity would be reported.
The efficiency of a market for a particular stock refers to the speed at
which the available information about that stock is incorporated into the
price per share. ISS In an efficient market, competition among market
participants results in a price that is a close approximation of the actual
value of the security.IS9
Off-exchange and in-house transactions pose no threat to market ef-
ficiency, because the consolidated transaction reporting system would
still publicize both types of activity, and these trades would still exert an
appropriate influence on price levels in all markets. l60 The SEC has full
authority under section 15(c)(5) of the 1934 Act to prescribe rules neces-
sary or appropriate "to remove impediments to and perfect the mecha-
nism of a national market system."161 Accordingly, the Commission can
impose whatever requirements it deems necessary to enhance the flow of
information among trading centers and thereby alleviate all of the alleged
dangers associated with removing barriers to competition.
E. Delisting: The Role ofFormal Securities Exchanges in a National
Market System
Ironically, researchers have found that listing a stock on an organ-
Rule IOb-5 was promulgated under § 1O(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b)
(1976). Rule IOb-5 forbids, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security, any person from
making an untrue statement of a material fact or employing any device, scheme, or artiface to de-
fraud, or engaging in any act that would operate as a fraud or deceit upon customers. 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.lOb-5 (1979). Section 9(e) of the Securities Act of 1934 creates a private right of action against
persons who engage in the manipulation of securities prices by creating the false appearance of
trading activity. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1980). Section 18 of the Securities Act of 1934 creates a private
cause of action against persons who "make or cause to be made" materially misleading statements or
reports or other documents filed with the SEC. 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (1980).
157. See. e.g., Wachovia Bank & Trust Co. v. National Student Mktg. Corp., 650 F.2d 342
(D.C. Cir. 1980) (granting an implied private right of action for damages under rule 10b-5, in a
different context).
158. J. LoRIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET-THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70 (1973);
Fama, Random Walks in Stock Market Prices, FIN. ANALYSTS J., Sept.-<>Ct. 1965, at 55.
159. Competition should lead
to a situation where, at any point in time, actual prices of individual securities already reflect the
effects of information based both on events that have already occurred and on events, which, as
of now, the market expects to take place in the future. In other words, in an efficient market at
any point in time the actual price of a security will be a good estimate of its intrinsic value.
[d. at 56.
160. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13.662,42 Fed. Reg. 33,510, 33,516-517 (1977).
161. See supra text accompanying notes 28-30.
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ized exchange may decrease the liquidity for that stoCk. 162 This finding
runs directly counter to the position of the exchanges' proponents, who
see exchange listing as a goal which can be attained only by large, high
net worth companies, the stock of which the proponents consider liq-
uid. 163 For example, exchange listing dictates that issuers meet stringent
financial requirements as to number of shares outstanding, number of
shareholders holding one hundred or more shares, and earning power in
excess of a stated minimum. 164
A recent empirical study, using multiple regression and several dif-
ferent measures of liquidity, analyzed the relationship between liquidity
and exchange listing165 for certain stocks listed between 1979 and
1982. 166 The authors noted that because the management of the issuing
company presumably made the decision to list only after analyzing the
benefits and costs of listing, the decision apparently reflects the com-
pany's expectation that listing will increase stock liquidity while reducing
the risk and cost of equity.167 But the study results suggested just the
opposite result. The researchers did not find evidence that listing con-
tributes to greater liquidity; moreover, the researchers also found that the
multiple regression analysis suggested that listing reduces liquidity a sub-
stantial degree. 168
While these empirical results are somewhat counter-intuitive, over-
the-counter trading has some obvious advantages over exchange trad-
ing-at least for certain stocks. As Judge Friendly has pointed out, a
firm acting as market maker in the over-the-counter market "serves a
highly desirable purpose in reducing ... spreads. "169 Commenta-
162. See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text.
163. Letter from William Batten to the Editor, Wall St. J., June 18, 1982, at 28.
164. The NYSE
has repeatedly raised its minimum numerical standards so that it now looks in general for I
million publicly held shares; 2,000 holders (including beneficial holders of stock held in "street
name") of 100 shares or more; demonstrated earning power under competitive conditions of
$2.5 million before taxes during the latest year and $2 million during the preceding two years;
and an aggregate market value of $8 million for the publicly held shares.
L. Loss, supra note 75, at 484; 2 Constitution and Rules, N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 11 2295(B) (June
1980). See also NYSE Manual, supra note 10, at A-34 to A-34.5 (Aug. I, 1977); Comment, supra
note 10.
165. D. Fraser & J. Groth, Listing and the Liquidity of Bank Stocks (1983) (unpublished manu-
script on file with the University of I//inois Law Review).
166. [d. at 1. The stocks in the study were commercial bank and commercial bank holding
companies. The number of these stocks traded on organized exchanges has increased dramatically
in recent years. [d.
167. [d.
168. [d. If the organized stock exchanges perform a valuable service to the marketplace by
providing information about the quality of exchange listed stocks, evidence about liquidity, such as
that compiled by Fraser and Groth, is not conclusive about the desirability of off-exchange trading.
See supra text accompanying notes 166-67. If the New York Stock Exchange is providing a valuable
certification service to consumers about the stocks it lists, then off-exchange trading permits non-
member traders to "free ride" by trading in listed securities without paying for this certification
service.
169. Chasins v. Smith Barney & Co., 438 F.2d 1167, 1176 (2d Cir. 1971) (Friendly, J., dissent-
ing from denial of reconsideration en bane).
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tors, to paraphrase Judge Friendly, have widely acknowledged that one
can obtain the best price by dealing directly with market makers and
avoiding commissions to intermediaries such as exchange specialists. 17D
Similarly, since different market makers will have different percep-
tions of the market over time, price spreads will decrease through over-
lapping market quotations. For example, if trader X quotes a market of
$10 bid, $11 offered, and trader Y quotes a market of $10-1/4 bid, $11-
1/4 offered, the market spread falls from 1 point (the difference between
$10 and $11, or $10-1/4 and $11-1/4) to 3/4 point (the difference be-
tween $10-1/4 and $11). And, if there are other market makers quoting
markets, spreads may be reduced even further. Because there are an
average of 7.4 market makers l71 for each over-the-counter stock, com-
pared with the single exchange specialist, perhaps it should not be sur-
prising that over-the-counter stocks are more liquid than exchange
traded stocks.
A final advantage of over-the-counter trading over exchange trading
concerns the relative infrequency of trading halts. This advantage arises
because the over-the-counter market makers are free of regulation by any
exchange. The exchanges, particularly the NYSE, frequently stop trad-
ing in exchange-listed stocks when bad news causes shareholders to flood
the exchange with sell orders. 172 Exchange members, who conduct most
of the research and selling activity associated with exchange-listed
stocks, are prohibited by off-board trading restrictions from making a
market in these stocks during a trading halt. Accordingly, would-be
buyers and sellers frequently have nowhere to turn during a halt.
A recent widely reported example concerned Warner Communica-
tions stock. 173 Warner Communications and its shareholders had expec-
tations of high sales figures from the company's Atari division. When
the company announced significantly lower sales figures than expected,
the stock price plummeted one and three-quarters points in just eight
minutes and then the NYSE stopped all trading. As one financial writer
succinctly remarked, "[a] lot of people wanted to unload Warner stock
... too bad for them."174 Only when a brokerage firm that did not
belong to any exchange began making a market in Warner stock did
trading in Warner resume. 175 The NYSE followed more than a day later.
But if firms do better in the over-the-counter market, one must ques-
170. Id. See a/so In re Thompson & McKinnon, FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 11 77,572 (1968); In
re Delaware Managemenl Co., [1966-67 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REp. (CCH) 1177,458 (1967);
In re H.C. Keister & Co., [1966-67 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 11 77,414 (1966);
REPORT OF THE SEC ON THE PUBLIC POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF INVESTMENT CoMPANY
GROWTH, H.R. REP. No. 2337, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. 179 (1966).
171. NASDAQ SECURITIES FACT BooK 91 (1983); see also Lee, Off the Boards: Why ore is
Favored Over NYSE, BARRONS, Sept. 12, 1983, at 42, cols. 1 & 5.
172. See Lee, supra note 171, at 43, col. 1 (trading halts are not unusual).
173. Id. See N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1983, at 73 (Magazine).
174. See Lee, supra note 171, at 43, col. 1.
175. Id.
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tion why firms listed on the organized exchanges do not voluntarily de-
list. One answer is that exchange rules, with full SEC support, make it
extraordinarily difficult for a listed company to delist voluntarily. The
1934 Act provides that upon application to the Commission by the issuer
or an exchange, a "security registered with a national securities exchange
may be withdrawn or stricken from listing and registration in accordance
with the rules of the exchange and, upon such terms as the Commission
may deem necessary to impose for the protection of investors ...."176
The NYSE delisting guidelines, which an issuer must satisfy under sec-
tion 12(d) of the 1934 Act before applying to the SEC for deregistra-
tion,177 provide that two-thirds of the issuer's shareholders must vote to
delist, and no more than ten percent can oppose such delisting. 178 Fur-
thermore, the Commission sometimes requires a majority vote of the
shareholders per capita. 179 These requirements make it particularly diffi-
cult for those institutions with large stock holdings to obtain delisting. 180
Also, even if institutional investors wish to delist a corporation in which
they have large holdings, a minority of small shareholders can block the
delisting.
Of course, organized stock exchanges may serve a useful purpose for
thinly traded issues. 181 Specialists who provide a continuous market for
a stock receive access to the limit order book and certain other trading
advantages in return. These specialists may provide liquidity for stocks
for which there is little interest among market makers. The problem
with this hypothetical example is that current exchange listing restric-
tions prohibit these thinly traded securities from enjoying the advantage
of having an exchange specialist provide a continuous market. Some
large companies182 are finding that "the over the counter market offers its
clients ... a better deal."IS3 But large firms, which might benefit from
having their stock traded over-the-counter, cannot readily get off the or-
ganized exchanges, while the small firms that might benefit from being
176. 1934 Act § 12d, 15 U.S.C. § 781(d) (1982).
177. Most exchanges have a similar requirement. See L. Loss, supra note 75, at 493 n.8.
178. See. e.g., Torrington Co., 19 S.E.C. 39 (1945).
179. Shawmut Ass'n, 15 S.E.C. 1028, 1040 (1944), ajf'd sub nom. Shawmut Ass'n v. SEC, 146
F.2d 791 (1st Cir. 1945), motion to modify terms of vote denied, 19 S.E.C. 719 (1945) (per capita
voting requirements imposed for issuer who wanted to delist from the Boston Stock Exchange, which
did not have its own voting requirements).
180. Delisting may occur if a corporation is insolvent, or goes private, or fails to meet specific
criteria established by the N.Y.S.E. See 2 Constitution and Rules, N.Y.S.E. GUIDE (CCH) 112499.20
(1983).
In Intercontinental Indus., 44 S.E.C. 273 (1970), [CCH) Sec. 77,827 (1969), the court granted
an application for delisting from a securities exchange because the issuer violated its listing agree-
ment by providing false information about company operations, rules, and earnings. Section B4 of
the N.Y.S.E. Manual notes the required fees that listed companies must pay to the Exchange. Pre-
sumably, a violation of this fee agreement might also result in involuntary delisting. But see supra
note 10 (observing that violation of Exchange listing rules may not result in delisting where the
NYSE would be harmed by such delisting).
181. See supra text accompanying note 147.
182. See Lee, supra note 171, at 42.
183. Id. at 42, col. 3.
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traded on the organized exchanges, cannot obtain exchange listing. Once
the SEC withdraws obstacles to delisting, exchanges may be forced to
turn their attention to smaller issuers as the larger companies delist in
favor of the over-the-counter market. If so, the exchanges will have an
incentive to revise their listing standards to attract these smaller issuers.
F. The Rule 19c-3 Stocks
When the SEC withdrew rule 19c_2,184 it simultaneously adopted
rule 19c-3 and announced that it planned to do nothing more towards
repealing off-board trading restrictions "in the near future.,,18S Rule 19c-
3 prohibits off-board trading restrictions for two types of stocks. First, it
prohibits restrictions on stocks that the exchanges listed for trading as of
April 26, 1979, but delisted at some future date. Second, it prohibits
restrictions on stocks that became listed on an exchange after that date.
Thus, the term 19c-3 stock refers to those stocks for which off-board
trading restrictions do not apply because they were delisted, or became
listed for the first time, after April 26, 1979.
Significantly, the Commission supported the adoption of the more
limited rule 19c-3 with the comment that the rule does not "involve the
potential for the kind of dramatic and radical effects on the existing ex-
change markets which have been predicted with regard to total repeal of
the off-board trading rules.,,186 Interestingly, this remark refers only to
the rule's effects on existing exchange markets, not to the rule's effect on
the general public or on potential competitors of the existing exchanges.
The SEC has never explained why the "dangers" of fragmentation and
overreaching are less for these rule 19c-3 stocks. If such dangers did
exist for stocks listed on an exchange as of April 26, 1979, why should
the dangers magically disappear upon delisting?187 Moreover, why
should such dangers not exist for newly listed stocks? The most plausible
explanation is that the SEC's political opportunity cost of protecting the
exchange cartel simply became too high. 188 The SEC realized it had to
buy off the more vocal of the opposition, the large national brokerage
firms who wanted to make markets, and rule 19c-3 seems to have
worked-at least for the moment.
184. See supra text accompanying notes 108-13.
185. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16.889,45 Fed. Reg. 41,157 (1980).
186. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15.769, 17 e.F.R. 240 (1979).
187. See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15.769, 44 Fed. Reg. 26,690 (1979):
Since most !inns currently providing continuous aTe [over-the-counter] markets with re-
spect to securities traded exclusively aTe are exchange members, when a security becomes
exchange traded for the first time, the pre-existing aTe market for that security is seriously
impaired, if not, as a practical matter extinguished. This situation is to be contrasted with the
consequences of adopting proposed Rule 19c-2, which would permit aTe trading by these same
exchange members in securities now confined, to a significant degree to exchange trading.
Id. See also Poser, supra note 26, at 938.
188. Cf Jarrell, supra note I, at 281.
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1. Rule 19c-3 and the Economics of Regulation
The April 26, 1979, line of demarcation for rule 19c-3 stocks is both
peculiar and arbitrary. The administrative process by which the rule
evolved is a telling commentary on the SEC's "capture" by members of
the organized exchanges. In 1977, the American Stock Exchange
(Amex) asked the SEC's permission to make a variety of foreign compa-
nies eligible for listing on that exchange. 189 The SEC recognized that
listing these companies would subject the stocks to the Amex's off-board
trading restrictions. 19o Nonetheless, the SEC approved the Amex's re-
quest. 191 The extension of off-board trading rules to these previously un-
listed stocks meant that exchange members who were acting as market
makers in the stocks had to cease such market making activity or else
resign from exchange membership. In These market makers "objected
strenuously and publicly" to the Commission's decision. 193 Only when
the SEC saw that some of the exchange's own members-the major trad-
ing firms--opposed extension of off-board trading restrictions, did the
SEC propose the limited liberalization of competitive restraint that rule
19c-3 represents. 194 Thus, rule 19c-3 represents a political compromise
between those exchange members manning the specialist posts and the
national market-making firms, with the SEC acting as a kind of modera-
tor standing between these special interests. Noticeably, this compro-
mise between the two powerful special interest groups ignores the rest of
the public.
It is helpful at this point to look more closely at how the major
trading firms caught the SEC's attention and forced this modification of
off-board trading restrictions. The losses to these firms from the listing
of the foreign stocks was immediate and calculable, and the firms placed
considerable pressure on the SEC to change its mind. The firms made
the SEC understand that the SEC's political opportunity cost of the in-
cremental resources expended in enforcing the anticompetitive regulation
outweighed the net political support that the SEC could obtain by en-
forcing the off-board restrictions. 195 The SEC's resulting behavior is con-
189. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13.931, 11 SEC Docket 1090 (1977).
190. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 13,542, 12 SEC Docket 429, 429-30 (1977).
191. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15.376, 16 SEC Docket 333, 338 (1978).
192. Apparently, the profitability of exchange membership is greater than the profitability of
over the counter market-making activity, because the exchange members usually cease market-mak-
ing activity, rather than withdrawing from the Exchange. With the off-board trading rules, resigna-
tion from exchange membership would be a viable alternative for most firms only if a sufficient
number of other members resigned simultaneously to permit such a firm to have access to a suitable
number of trading partners.
193. See Poser, supra note 26, at 937; Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15,376, 16 SEC
Docket 340 n.43 (1978).
194. See Poser, supra note 26, at 937 ("once the Commission found that the stock exchange
community did not fully support the off-board trading rules, it ... proposed Rule 19c-3").
195. This analysis is consistent with the theory of deregulating the New York Stock Exchange
that Jarrell applied to eliminating fixed rate commissions. See Jarrell, supra note I, at 281.
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sistent with what one would expect of a political support maximizing
regulator.
Apparently, however, the major trading firms' potential gains from
trading in exchange listed securities is more speculative, or the interests
of the specialist firms more entrenched, than was the case with the rule
19c-3 stocks. The net political pressure for complete elimination of off-
board trading restrictions brought to bear on the SEC is correspondingly
less. Thus, one can expect the SEC to abandon the remaining off-board
trading restrictions only if and when the potential gains to these trading
firms from removing the restrictions becomes more certain. This aban-
donment may occur when the major trading firms gain experience and
scale in market making, or alternatively, when the economic rents to the
exchange diminish, thus reducing the net political demand for these off-
board trading restrictions. '96 Only when one of these conditions occurs
can one expect the SEC to move to a new regulatory equilibrium.
2. The Fate of the Rule 19c-3 Stocks
During the first year in which rule 19c-3 stocks could be traded,
only 83 of the 167 rule 19c-3 common stocks were traded outside of an
organized exchange. '97 The remaining 84 issues were traded exclusively
on organized exchanges. '98 Moreover, only 15 issues had 10% or more
of their trades consummated outside of an exchange. '99 In sum, the first
year of over-the-counter trading in rule 19c-3 stocks was "very lim-
ited."2°O The market's lackadaisical reaction to the relaxation of off-
board trading restrictions for rule 19c-3 stocks does not imply, however,
that rule 19c-3 is ineffective. The problems with the rule are that the
analysis of it has been too superficial and that the sample of stocks to
which it applies is too small.
Of far more importance than considering where the securities trans-
actions take place is considering under what conditions they take place.
Assuming equivalent transaction costs, a trader should have no prefer-
ence for consummating a trade either on or off an exchange. Moreover,
most of the rule 19c-3 stocks are relatively minor issues, not the sort apt
to attract a lot of market makers even with total deregulation of the in-
dustry. What is relevant is the increased potential for competition cre-
ated by rule 19c-3. If the potential for competition from outside markets
196. In the case of fixed-rate commissions, the net political demand by the Exchange for regula-
tory protection declined as institutions turned away from the Exchange to consummate trades. Off-
board trading restrictions appear to offer the exchanges stronger advantages in holding trading activ-
ity than the fixed-rate commissions.
197. SEC DIREcrORATE OF EcONOMIC AND POLICY ANALYSIS AND DIVISION OF MARKET
REGULATION, A MONITORING REPORT ON THE OPERATION AND EFFECTS OF RULE 19c-3 UNDER
THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE Acr OF 1934, at g (1981) [hereinafter cited as EFFECTS OF 19c-3].
198. [d.
199. [d.
200. [d. at 7. See also Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,516,21 SEC Docket 1519, 1527-
28 (1981) ("great preponderance of trading in 19c-3 stocks takes place on exchanges").
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keeps traders' transactions costs low even though trades are concentrated
on the market, rule 19c-3 has had its intended effect. In brief, the same
sort of potential competition that keeps the prices of Harold Demsetz's
natural monopoly utility companies201 in line is capable of disciplining
securities exchanges as well-if the SEC does not fetter the potential
competition--even though there may be natural monopoly aspects to ex-
change dealing when the market for a particular security is thin.202
Therefore, the SEC's figures on where particular trades occur provide
little evidence of rule 19c-3's effectiveness.
However, exchange specialists may retain certain advantages that
discourage entry. First, only exchange specialists have access to the limit
order books that give the specialists a tremendous trading advantage over
any nonspecialist market makers.203 Second, as long as specialists re-
ceive large flows of orders, they can serve as market participants almost
without making a market in a stock, merely by standing at their posts
and putting orders together. To be a market maker, on the other hand, a
trader must be able to serve as a participant who stands ready to execute
orders promptly.204 This difference is a distinct disadvantage; only the
specialists get market information free-while other traders must run
risks to obtain similar information.
Interestingly, while securities traded exclusively over-the-counter
have an average of 8.2 market makers, 68% of the rule 19c-3 stocks have
no market makers at all. 205 There is an equilibrium number of market
makers for any given stock, just as there is an equilibrium number of
competing firms in any other industry. Demand and the nature of the
production function determine this number in conjunction with such
other factors as relative prices and licensing restrictions. For example,
large, actively-traded corporation stock, such as International Business
Machines (IBM) and Exxon, both of which consistently rank among the
exchanges' most active stocks, might well attract a multitude of market
makers.206 Most rule 19c-3 stocks, however, do not have any of the char-
acteristics that support a large number of market makers. In 1981, the
NYSE listed 1534 common stocks.207 Not a single rule 19c-3 security
appears among the NYSE's 200 most actively traded stocks. Although
most rule 19c-3 stocks are at the very bottom of the heap in reported
share volume, those few rule 19c-3 stocks that are more actively traded
have attracted a number of market makers. MCI, for example, is an
201. Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities, II J.L. & EcON. 55-65 (1968).
202. See supra text accompanying note 147. See also infra text accompanying notes 231-35.
203. See Demsetz, supra note 52, at 33.
204. See Poser, supra note 26, at 895.
205. See supra note 171. Of the 167 originall9c-3 stocks, 113 had no market makers at all. See
EFFECTS OF 19c-3, supra note 197, at 10.
206. Larger corporations that are traded over-the-counter have significant numbers of market
makers. NEWSWEEK, Oct. 3, 1983, at 79. The average number of market makers for over-the-
counter firms is eight, and one firm, Mel Communications has 29. Lee, supra note 171, at 42.
207. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE FACT BOOK 70 (1982).
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actively traded rule 19c-3 stock and it boasts twenty-nine market
makers.20s
3. Rule 19c-3 Stocks and the AT&T Experience
An important test of the ~pecialist's ability to retain a dominant sta-
tus in an open marketplace came from the split up of the American Tele-
phone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) into eight new firms. The
company that is legally considered to be the successor firm of the original
AT&T, which is still called AT&T, continues to operate interregional
long-distance facilities, among other things, but is not covered by rule
19c-3,209 The other seven splitoffs are rule 19c-3 stocks. The seven com-
panies ate American Information Technology (Ameritech), which in ad-
dition to being a regional operating company received most of the
research and development functions of the original AT&T, and the other
six regional operating companies,210 The trading in stocks of these latter
seven companies, at least in the i~itial stages, indicates how over-the-
counter market makers fare against exchange specialists for relatively
hig~ volume securities.
We have examined the securities transactions involving the shares of
common stock of the seven AT&T derivative companies that have rule
19c-3 status. Our examination covered the month of February 1984, the
first full month of spot trading for those securities.211 From the data, one
cannot ascertain the exact number of over-the-counter market makers for
each stock. Clearly, however, there were several market makers for the
stocks of each of the seven rule 19c-3 splitoffs because shares of each
company traded over-th~-counter on every trading day during Febru-
ary,212 Shares of each of the seven also traded during February on five
organized regional exchanges-Boston, Cincinnati, Midwest (Chicago),
Pacific (San Francisco), and Philadelphia.213
Table 1 gives a detailed summary of the findings. Only one percent
of the transactions involving the new AT&T stock, which does not have
rule 19c-3 status, occurred over-the:..counter. Because of off-board trad-
208. NASDAQ SECURITlES FACT BOOK 6 (1983).
209. See supra text following note 185 (explaining the contours of rule 19c-3 status).
210. The regional companies in addition to Ameritech are: Bell Atlantic, BellSouth, NYNEX,
PacTe1 Group, Southwestern Bell, and US WEST.
211. See Fitch Research, supra note 134. -
212. [d.
213. If we multiply the seven distinct kinds of splitoff common stock times the 20 trading days
in February 1984, we lind 140 "trading opportunities" during the month. Cincinnati seized just over
half the trading opportunities, 79 (56%), and the daily volumes were usually small. Philadelphia
exercised 123 of its 140 opportunities (88%), while Boston (138), the Midwest (139), and the Pacific
(139) traded at nearly every opportunity, Le., every splitoff traded on those exchanges on virtually
every day the exchange was open. The volume figures are roughly parallel; the Midwest was the
highest volume regional exchange for each of th~ securities over the month (but not every day of the
month), and usually by a wide margin. For all seven splitoffs, Cincinnati handled the smallest vol-
ume, again usually by a substantial margin. Boston, Pacific, and Philadelphia fell between in no
permanent order.
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TABLE 1
February, 1984 Trading Activity (in thousands of shares)
Total
Corporation Status NYSE Total Regional Over-the-counter--
AT&T non-19c-3 32,058 7,057 393
(81.1%) (17.9%) (1.0%)
Ameritech 19c-3 4,032 392 307
(85.2%) (8.3%) (6.5%)
Bell Atlantic 19c-3 4,510 411 319
(86.1%) (7.9%) (6.1%)
BellSouth 19c-3 4,777 398 363
(86.3%) (7.2%) (6.6%)
NYNEX 19c-3 3,863 485 615
(77.9%) (9.8%) (12.4%)
PacTel Group 19c-3 6,067 471 544
(85.7%) (6.7%) (7.7%)
Southwestern Bell 19c-3 4,298 591 573
(78.7%) (10.8%) (10.5%)
US WEST 19c-3 6,464 377 360
(89.8%) (5.2%) (5.0%)
TOTAL 19c-3 34,012 3,124 3,080
(84.6%) (7.8%) (7.7%)
ing restrictions, this one percent must represent direct swaps by institu-
tional investors, or trades using brokerage houses that are not members
of any exchange. In contrast, for the seven splitoffs, nearly eight percent
of the shares went over-the-counter, roughly the same number as went
through the regional exchanges. The lowest percentage of over-the-
counter shares was five percent for US WEST, but that was roughly
equal to the percent of US WEST shares transacted through regional
exchanges.214
Our firm-by-firm daily breakdown reveals that on eight of twenty
trading days, more Ameritech shares went over-the-counter than
through all regional exchanges combined. Similar statistics for the other
splitoffs are nine of twenty trading days for US WEST, ten of twenty for
NYNEX, eleven of twenty for Bell Atlantic and BellSouth, and twelve of
twenty for PacTel Group and Southwestern Bell. On only six days out of
twenty did any single regional exchange handle as many shares of Amer-
itech as went over-the-counter. A single regional exchange surpassed
over-the-counter activity on only five days for Bell Atlantic, NYNEX,
214. If it is proper to use the surviving corpora1ion as a baseline, then one must conclude that
the over-the-counter inroads by volume came entirely at the expense of the regional exchanges. The
NYSE actually handles a slightly higher percentage of transactions for the 19c-3 splitoffs than for
the surviving corporation. This interesting observation may motivate an entire study to more clearly
define the diversity of interests across brokerage houses, but that lies beyond the scope of this article.
Notice, however, that an increase in volume percentage for the NYSE does not imply an improve-
ment in commissions earned on the NYSE. The bid-ask spread should be expected to fall as the
number of market-making competitors for the NYSE specialist increases.
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PacTel Group, and Southwestern Bell, for three days for BellSouth, and
for only two of the twenty trading days for US WEST.215
The data implies that the market for shares of the splitoffs is large
enough to support several over-the-counter market makers. After all, the
five regional exchanges that handle these securities support five special-
ists, for a volume of transactions similar to the volume handled over-the-
counter.216 Thus, if the national market system fails, it clearly is not
because the market has already reached its most efficient configura-
tion.217 Because legally-sanctioned entry barriers are less extreme for
over-the-counter market makers than regional specialists, the AT&T
breakup data is consistent with the notion that these market makers, and
not the regional markets, are the most potent competitors of the NYSE
specialist for handling the shares of these major rule 19c-3 securities.
This potential for increased competition explains the continued strong
demand from the exchanges for the SEC to protect against over-the-
counter market makers. This demand, and not market forces, is imped-
ing the development of a national market system.
The problem with drawing conclusions, as the SEC attempts to do,
from the trading patterns of the limited number of rule 19c-3 securities,
is that expecting active trading in all stocks to take place under all cir-
cumstances is simply unrealistic. A more valuable test of the effect of
free entry by market makers would be to remove off-board trading re-
strictions for some of the exchange's most active stocks, on a temporary
basis, to see how trading patterns in these issues develop. The AT&T
splitoffs provide the most useful sample to date, but the SEC might rea-
sonably augment the sample by asking other candidates to apply for a
status similar to rule 19c-3.
The data seems inconsistent with the SEC contention that ineffective
communication between the exchanges and the over-the-counter markets
accounts for the failure of rule 19c_3.218 The SEC's explanation goes
something like this: imagine that a client asks a broker to buy 500 shares
of XYZ stock at the best price obtainable. The broker informs the firm's
215. This information is on file with the University of Illinois Law Review.
We undertook a more detailed study of trading the shares of one randomly selected splitoff,
NYNEX. From that study, if one conceptualizes a unitary over-the-counter "exchange," that ex-
change ranked first on 15 days, second on 4, and third on I. The Midwest ranked first on four days,
the Pacific ranked first on one day, and was second the day the over-the-counter market was third.
Invariably, the days that the regional exchange supplanted the over-the-counter "exchange" were
characterized by large block transactions on the regional exchange. Indeed, in several instances
more than half the volume handled by the regional arose from a single transaction. Fitch Research,
supra note 134.
216. For NYNEX, an average 30,425 shares per day traded over-the-counter compared to an
average for the combined regional exchanges of 24,535-roughly 81 % of the over-the-counter vol·
ume. At the other extreme, 15,930 shares per day of Bell Atlantic went over-the-counter while the
combined regionals handled 20,560, or 129% of the over-the-counter volume. Even here the largest
regional, the Midwest, with 11,320 shares per day, had only 71% of the over-the-counter volume.
Id.
217. See supra text accompanying note 31.
218. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,516,21 SEC Docket 1519, 1527-28 (1981).
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trading department of this order, and the department checks its com-
puter screen for price listings in XYZ stock. The exchange specialist is
offering XYZ stock at $11.00, but an over-the-counter market maker is
offering it at $10.50. Upon checking with the market maker, however,
the traper finds that the market maker has simply not bothered to change
the price o,n the computer screen for some time, and is now quoting an
offering price of $11.50 because the market has been moving up all morn-
ing. So, the trader calls the exchange specialist back only to find that the
specialist has made several sales at $11.00 and is now selling at $12.00.
By trying to get the best price, the trader now must pay $1.00 more than
if he had simply taken the specialist's order in the first place.
The SEC and the stock exchanges both point to this hypothesized
phenomenon as a reason why the exchanges are indispensable.219 But if
such a phenomenon does occur, then brokers will stop canvassing the
supposedly unreliable market makers, and the exchanges will remain
dominant with or without the SEC's regulation. Thus, any resources
spent on the SEC are redundant, and hence wasted. Moreover, even
under the SEC scenario, the problem, best described as an execution
problem, is short term in duration, and will exist in any system until the
industry "shakes down" and the appropriate firms ultimately emerge as
market makers.22o This is exactly what has happened in the airline in-
dustry following deregulation. Finally, the SEC is perfectly capable of
insisting that market makers stand behind their quotes. Better yet, Con-
gress could give disappointed investors private tort protection against
such carelessness without the need for any SEC action.
Thus far, the SEC's efforts to insure that market makers stand be-
hind their published bids and offerings, which began as early as July
1976, have been unsuccessfup21 A rule known as the "quote rule" re-
quired market makers to execute any order at a price as good as or better
than the advertised price, in any round lot amount up to the published
size of the quotation.222 The SEC adopted the quote rule in 1978,223 but
only after it had amended the rule sufficiently to make it virtually useless.
Instead of displaying an individual market maker's quotations, the sys-
temonly displayed a single quotation supplied by each exchange. Such a
system, of course, prevented direct contact with the market maker, and
made it impossible to identify the party obligated to meet the system
price. A purchaser or seller still had to go through the specialist on the
exchange, because the investor had no other means of discovering who
219. See SEC Exchange Act Release No. 11.942,41 Fed, Reg, 4507, 4512 (1976). See also text
accompanying notes 125-34, particularly at note 127 (discussing SEC's concerns).
220. But see Cohen, The National Market System-A Modest Proposal, 46 GEO. WASH, L. REv.
743, 776-78 (1978) (arguing generally that regulation is necessary to define the rights and obligations
of market makers).
221. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 12,670,41 Fed. Reg. 32,856, 32,856 (1976).
222, [d. at 32,858.
223. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 14,415,43 Fed. Reg, 4342, 4342 (1978) (adopting rule
11Acl-l; to be codified at 17 C.F.R. 240).
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was making the bids and offerings. The quote rule proved a dismal fail-
ure. Market makers frequently would not honor the published quota-
tions224 upon which the investor was relying, because there was a time
lag as the orders went through the specialist on the floor of the exchange.
Consequently, before the investor could indirectly contact the market
maker, the market maker often had altered the quote.
The expectation of success would have increased had the SEC both
permitted individual firms as well as exchange specialists to quote bids
and offerings directly on the system on a voluntary basis, and required
the firms who used the system to honor their quotations.22s Currently,
the SEC only requires that already completed transactions be reported
on a consolidated tape system. This requirement is of limited value.226
Critics might suggest that requiring firms to honor the price that
they quote on the system would discourage the firms from becoming
market makers. But the firms can change the bids and offering prices
instantaneously or delete them altogether. The market makers can also
select maximum volume limits to increase their protection. The only
cost to the market maker consists of monitoring the screen, probably by
computer software rather than manually, and updating the information.
If this cost to a firm is greater than the benefits of acting as a market
maker, the firm will simply choose not to act as a market maker. In fact,
even without a specific rule, the practice in several markets-the United
States Government Securities Market, the Municipal Bond Market, and
the Foreign Exchange Markets-is identical to the rule posited above.227
Respectable firms in these markets stick to their bid and offered prices.
Even in the municipal bond market, which does not use a computerized
system, and where traders communicate all bids and offerings orally,
firms are willing to stick by their prices until they give notice of changes.
G. Rent Seeking On the Exchange: The Exchange Specialist's Role
Defined
Although already mentioned several times, the role of the exchange
specialist deserves special attention because the specialist is the direct
beneficiary of the protection afforded by the SEC enforcement of ex-
224. Securities Exchange Act Release No. 17,583,46 Fed. Reg. 15,713, 15,715 (1981).
225. This simply means that if a finn is displaying a bid of $11.00 and refuses to honor its bid, so
that a seller must sell elsewhere at $10.75, the finn displaying the bid is responsible for honoring its
displayed quotation by paying 25¢ per share to its erstwhile customer.
226. The consolidated tape system was not part of the SEC's planned implementation of the
national market system legislation. The SEC proposed such a system, which allows disclosure of the
volume and price of trades soon after consummation, in 1972. Securities Exchange Act Release No.
9530, 37 Fed. Reg. 5761 (1972) (proposing rule 17a-15). This system merely expanded to the re-
gional exchanges and the over-the-counter market the "ticker tapes" that the NYSE has used since
the late nineteenth century. SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 56, at 43. The consolidated tape has proved
of limited value since the tape does not provide any "indication of present trading interests." Poser.
supra note 26, at 918.
227. See Henning, Pigott & Scott, supra note 128, at 307.
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change rules. The specialist system is the heart of the traditional stock
exchange,228 and the founders designed it to serve two functions. First,
the specialist provides a mechanism for handling limit orders-sell or-
ders above or buy orders below the current market price. Second, the
specialist should provide continuity and liquidity in the market and re-
duce random price fluctuations. 229
The specialist system actually handles the first function quite poorly.
Suppose, for example, a security is trading at $40-1/2 bid, $41-1/2 of-
fered, and a customer places an order to sell if the market moves to
$42.00 bid. Presently, the specialist enters this information in his book
and no one else knows the market's interest for this security.230 Suppose
further that there are many sell orders at the $42.00 level, but few limit
buy orders above $35.00. The specialist will know that a purchase of the
stock at the current $41-1/2 price would be foolish, since the stock price
not only has little chance of rising above $42.00 when all of the limit
orders to sell are activated, but also has a real chance of dropping several
dollars per share. Furthermore, other potential market makers know
that the specialist is privy to such valuable market information, and thus
are impeded from entering the arena; there is no "level playing-field."
Other factors also give the specialist an advantage over other poten-
tial traders. For instance, the specialist decides the price at which the
stock opens on each trading day,231 determines whether the stock should
be traded at all, and holds a monopoly position as sole trader for "her"
or "his" security on the exchange floor. 232 None of these specialist func-
tions are essential in a computerized market, and in fact the functions
actually seem undesirable. A fully computerized market could operate
non-stop around the clock, so that the opening price would be a moot
question. The specialist's monopoly position would disappear if a variety
of market makers were permitted to trade the security. Limit orders
could be handled by individual market makers, subject to the applicable
principles of disclosure, or by a consolidated computerized limit order
book.
Furthermore, even the actual services that the specialist performs
are often less valuable than they immediately appear. For example,
agency principles mandate that stockbrokers obtain the best price possi-
ble when consummating securities transactions on a customer's behalf.233
Most orders are "at the market" rather than limit orders, but the same
agency principles apply to both kinds of orders. When a customer places
228. See R. JENNINGS & H. MARSH, supra note 21, at 490.
229. Id. Because specialists reduce the attractiveness of the security to other potential market
makers, whether specialists enhance continuity and liquidity in the marketplace is unclear.
230. Id. at 490.
231. See Note, The Downstairs Insider: The Specialist and Rule lOb-5, 42 N.Y.U. L. REV. 695,
697 (1976).
232. Id. See also SPECIAL STUDY, supra note 56, at 57.
233. See REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 424 (1958).
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an order with an exchange specialist, however, the customer is "pro-
tected" only in that market. The customer is assured that the specialist
will execute the limit order when the stock reaches the specified price,
before the specialist makes any transactions at a more favorable price,234
but this protection does not extend beyond the market where the cus-
tomer's order is held. For example, if the current market for a stock that
is listed on the Cincinnati exchange is $10 bid, $11 offered, and a cus-
tomer places an order to sell when the stock reaches $12, transactions
may still take place at the $12 level or even higher in other markets with-
out triggering the customer's limit order. In the event that the customer
placed the order with a stockbroker affiliated with a brokerage house that
belongs to the Cincinnati Stock Exchange, that exchange's off-board
trading rule will sometimes prohibit the broker from consummating the
trade at the best possible price because of the restriction on in-house
agency crosses. The exchange rules do not allow a broker to legally cross
a buyer's limit order on one market with a seller's limit order on another
market.
VI. CONCLUSION
What the SEC needs to do, then, is to promulgate rules that relax
restrictions against off-board trading, so that there is only one market-a
national market-rather than a number of "independent" markets com-
peting against each other. This is the necessary first step, and once the
SEC takes it, market forces will take care of the next step--developing
the necessary reporting and communication systems to guarantee the
saccess of a truly competitive, truly national market system for securi-
ties. If the established exchanges do provide a needed service at a com-
petitive price, they will survive; if they do not, more efficient alternatives
will replace them.
Presently, there is no national market system in this country, and
indeed there is little promise of one in the near future, despite Congress's
clear directive. The SEC has chosen to disregard Congress and instead
support inefficient rules that grant favors to special interests, such as the
exchange specialists, and to the exchanges themselves. The mere exist-
ence of these rules will continue to impede progress toward developing a
workable national market system, and for no socially beneficial reason.
Rather, the SEC is acting to protect entrenched institutions. The SEC
has done virtually nothing besides talk about the need to develop more
advanced intermarket communications systems. Congress anticipated
that removal of SEC restrictions on trading would cause the appropriate
234. Harman. The Evolution of the National Market System. 33 Bus. LAW 2275. 2286 (1978)
(although a limit order is protected in the market where it is placed, transactions may take place
elsewhere at a more favorable price). Our own argument about arbitrageurs. see supra text following
note 134, implies this is unlikely to be a serious problem in practice, however. Prices across ex-
changes were identical at any moment for the seven AT&T spinoffs.
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communications systems to develop through market forces, leading inex-
orably to a healthy national market system with the concomitant benefits
of lower transactions costs and increased liquidity. Unless the SEC
shows a change of direction, however, it will not s90n give the partici-
pants in the American securities markets the type of national market sys-
tem Congress envisions.
